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Preface 
This conclusive thesis forms part of the course MSc Energy Management at 
Bodø Graduate School of Business and MGIMO University in Moscow.  
 
Reinertsen AS is so far the only Norwegian energy sector supplier that has made 
a serious effort to enter the Russian market. The aim of the thesis is to identify 
which factors played part in making Reinertsen NWR’s establishment in 
Murmansk an unprecedented success. 
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Abstract 
Russian-Norwegian cooperation and the term “The High North” have been 
subject to increased attention, especially from an energy perspective. The 
impression that North West Russia holds a great promise for Norwegian 
companies has been widely projected by media and politicians. The lack of 
energy business initiative in North-West Russia is however curiously absent, 
save for one company, the case of this study, who has achieved success in short 
time.  
 
This thesis utilizes internationalization theory to analyze why Reinertsen 
NWR’s establishment in Murmansk was successful. The findings suggest that 
managerial commitment, a broad resource base and re-export have played 
important roles for a successful start-up.  
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 РЕЗЮМЕ 
Сотрудничество между Россией и Норвегией в регионе Крайнего Севера, в 
особенности в связи с развитием топливно-энергетических проектов 
привлекает к себе все больше внимания. Как в прессе, так и на 
политическом уровне выражается крайняя перспективность данного 
сотрудничества для норвежских компаний. Весьма любопытным в этой 
связи является рассмотрение деятельности одной из компаний, 
добившейся значительных результатов за достаточно короткий 
промежуток времени. 
 
В рамках данного исследования проводится анализ деятельности 
компании Reinertsen NWR с позиций теории интернационализации. 
Изучаемая компания разместила свое представительство в г. Мурманск, 
что оказалось весьма удачным решением. В исследовании 
рассматриваются факторы, обеспечившие успех, которого компания 
достигла за весьма короткое время. Предположительно, значительную 
роль сыграли следующие обстоятельства: особый подход к менеджменту, 
богатые природные ресурсы и осуществление операций реэкспорта. 
  Bodø Graduate School of Business                                                         - V - 
 
Sammendrag  
Norsk-russisk samarbeid og begrepet ”Nordområdene” har de siste to årene vært 
gjenstand for økt norsk og internasjonal oppmerksomhet. Mulighetene innen 
petroleumsutvinning har vært spesielt i søkelyset. Inntrykket av de lovende 
mulighetene for norske selskaper i Nordvest-Russland har blitt fremmet av 
media, politikere og forskjellige forskningsinstitusjoner.  
 
På bakgrunn av denne bonansaen ønsket forfatterne å foreta et komparativt 
casestudium for å se på hvilke faktorer som fører til suksess i energibransjen i 
Nordvest-Russland. Mangelen på initiativ fra norsk næringsliv ble tidlig 
åpenbar, og studiet ble endret til en grundig analyse av den eneste aktøren i 
energibransjen som har lykkes i Nordvest-Russland, Reinertsen NWR.  
 
Studiet tar i bruk internasjonaliseringsteori for å analysere hvorfor etableringen 
av produksjonsbedriften Reinertsen NWR har vært en enestående suksess. 
Funnene indikerer blant annet at en engasjert toppledelse, en bred ressursbase, 
uavhengighet fra markedsforhold samt å unngå partnerskap med en russisk 
enhet har spilt avgjørende roller for suksess i oppstartsfasen.  
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Glossary  
 
Autonomous Okrug: Russian Autonomous district: More autonomous than 
oblasts but less than republics; usually with substantial or predominant 
ethnic minority. Russia has 7 autonomous Okrugs (Wikipedia, 2007). 
 
Babushka: Russian for old woman or grandmother (Gosiva, 2007).  
 
Barents 2020: A Norwegian initiative to contribute to stronger focus on the 
High North with emphasis on research and cooperation projects with 
Russia (Norwegian Government, 2006).  
 
Barents Sea: Outlying portion of the Arctic Ocean. Bounded by the Norwegian 
and northwestern Russian mainland (south), the Norwegian Sea and 
Svalbard (west), Franz Josef Land (north), and the Kara Sea and Novaya 
Zemlya (east) (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, 2007).  
 
Continental Shelf: The sea bed and the soil beneath it that is adjacent to the 
coast of a maritime state and outside the limits of the state's territorial 
waters (Barber, 2004). 
 
Foreign Direct Investment: The acquisition by residents of a country of real 
assets abroad. This may be done by remitting money abroad to be spent on 
acquiring land, constructing buildings, mines, or machinery, or buying 
existing foreign businesses (Black, 2007). 
 
Gazflot: Gazprom wholly owned subsidiary. Besides ship-owning and freight 
operations it conducts exploration, drilling operations, production and 
transport of oil and gas (Gazflot, 2007).  
 
Gazprom: The largest Russian company and the biggest extractor of natural gas 
in the world. It is owned by the Russian state.  
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Glasnost: The policy or practice of more open government and wider 
dissemination of information in the former Soviet Union (Barber, 2004). 
 
Governor: The uppermost elected representative of an administrative subject 
(except for Republics) in Russia.  
 
GULAG: The system of forced-labor camps in the Soviet Union in which 
millions died. Besides ordinary criminals, inmates included dissident 
intellectuals, members of ethnic groups suspected of disloyalty, and 
members of political factions who had lost power. Although the Gulag 
was officially disbanded in 1955, a system of labor colonies remained 
(Barber, 2004). 
 
Innovation Norway: Innovation Norway offers products and services intended 
to help boost innovation in business and industry nationwide, foster 
regional development and promote Norwegian industry and Norway as a 
tourist destination. 
 
INTSOK: Norwegian oil and gas partner organization. Established in 1997 by 
the Norwegian oil and gas industry and the Norwegian Government 
(Intsok, 2007). 
 
Krai: Russian Territory: Essentially the same as oblasts. The title "territory" is 
historic, originally given because they were once considered frontier 
regions. Russia has 7 Krais. (Wikipedia, 2007) 
 
Low-cost country: A country with low labour and production costs (Black, 
2007)  
 
LukOil: Russia’s second largest oil company. Privately owned.  
 
Monchebank: DNB-Nor’s Russian bank.  
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Multinational company: A firm conducting business in more than one country, 
through branches or subsidiary companies.  
 
Murmansk: a port in NW Russia, on the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula, 
in the Barents Sea. It is the largest city north of the Arctic Circle and its 
port is ice-free throughout the year (Barber, 2004). 
 
NGO: The term pressure group has increasingly been displaced by non-
governmental organization (NGO). The term originated with the United 
Nations, which made provision in its charter to give such organizations 
consultative status (Grant, 2003).  
 
Oblast: Russian Province: Regular administrative units with federally 
appointed governor and locally elected legislature. Commonly named after 
the oblast center — the largest city in the oblast, its administrative center. 
Russia has 48 oblasts. (Wikipedia, 2007) 
 
Offshore Zone: A national territory with special rights in economy and 
business,     exclusive management and attractive conditions for both 
national and international investors (Matusevich, 2006). 
 
Oligarch: The term came into wide circulation after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in application to the people that became extremely wealthy in some 
post-Soviet republics (Hoffman, 2004). 
 
Perestroika: The policy or practice of reforming the economic and political 
system, practiced in the 1980s in the former Soviet Union. 
 
Prirazlomnoye: Oil field located south-east in the Barents Sea. Owned by 
Owned by Rosneft daughter Yuganskneftegaz (Rosneft, 2007).  
 
Production Sharing Agreement: Are used primarily to determine the share a 
private company will receive of the natural resources (usually oil) 
extracted from a particular country (Wikipedia, 2007. 
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Reinertsen AS: A Trondheim based engineering and construction company. 
 
Reinertsen NWR: “Short for Reinertsen North-West Russia”, Reinertsen AS’ 
wholly owned Murmansk subsidiary.  
 
Republic: Russian Republic: Nominally autonomous, each has its own 
constitution, president and parliament; is represented by the federal 
government in international affairs; and is meant to be home to a specific 
ethnic minority. Russia has 21 republics. (Wikipedia, 2007) 
 
Rosneft: Russia’s largest oil company (May, 2007), it has grown rapidly over 
the last years seizing former Yukon assets in rigged auctions. State owned.  
 
Shtokman: A giant gas field outside North-West Russia.  
 
Special Economic Zone: A geographical region that has economic laws that are 
more liberal than a country’s typical economic laws. Usually the goal is to 
increase Foreign Direct Investment.  
 
Success factors: The strength and weaknesses that affect an organization’s 
success (Law, 2006).  
 
The High North: The circumpolar area around the North Pole, as well as parts 
of northern Russia, Canada, USA and Scandinavia.  
 
The Russian Federation: The official name for Russia.  
 
Value chain: The chain of activities by which a good or service is produced, 
distributed, and marketed (Black, 2007). 
 
Wholly owned subsidiary: A subsidiary undertaking that is owned 100% by a 
holding company (i.e. there is no minority interest) (Black, 2007).
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Introduction 
As pioneer students of MSc Energy Management, a unique MSc program of its kind, 
the authors have had the opportunity to participate in a joint Russian / Norwegian 
group tutored in Moscow and Bodø. As a result of this it was natural to write a thesis 
on Russian / Norwegian cooperation.  
 
Russian-Norwegian cooperation and the term “The High North” have been subject to 
increased Norwegian and global attention, especially from an energy perspective. The 
impression that North-West Russia holds a great promise for Norwegian companies 
has been widely projected by the media, various institutions and politicians. We 
initially set out to do a more comprehensive study with several cases from Norwegian 
establishments into North-West Russia. However the lack of energy business initiative 
in North-West Russia soon became apparent, save for one company, the case of this 
study, who has achieved success in short time.  
 
No matter which consultant we talked to concerning petroleum business in North 
West Russia, one company was mentioned over and over: Reinertsen NWR. Kåre 
Storvik and Geir Reiersen, two leading Norwegian experts on North West Russia, 
emphasized that this company was the only Norwegian company successfully doing 
business in the petroleum market in North West Russia. Håkon Skretting, Intsok’s 
Regional Director for the Russian market points out that Reinertsen NWR is the 
leading Norwegian petroleum supply company established in Russia, and it is 
growing steadily (Skretting, 2007).  
 
Thus we decided to design a narrower and deeper study, focusing on that single 
company that has not only talked the talk, but also walked the walk, a walk that has 
been fast and successful. Three months after Reinertsen AS decided to establish a 
subsidiary in Murmansk, Reinertsen NWR produced their first unit (Arena, 2006). 
Reinertsen NWR has received praise from both Statoil and Hydro for their production 
conditions in Murmansk (Thirud, 2006). They have obtained lower production costs 
and a competitive advantage in their home market without compromising on quality 
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and ability to deliver on time. Two years after the establishment they gained a profit, 3 
years ahead of schedule (DN, 2007). At the time they are building a production 
facility neighboring the Gazprom subsidiary Gazflot and even Russian oil business 
people are praising the Norwegian company’s progress (DN, 2007; NRK, 2007b).  
 
The thesis utilizes internationalization theory to analyze why Reinertsen NWR’s 
establishment in Murmansk was successful. The scientific contribution of the work is 
within internationalization theory, shedding light on which factors were in practice 
crucial to success and which were less important in this specific case. The theory on 
internationalization is extensive and is under continuous revision. Our findings will 
contribute to this work.  
 
The practical contribution will be to companies that are looking eastwards. They will 
undoubtedly be able to extract elements from the work, adding valuable insight to 
their own prospective internationalization processes. The analysis shows that some 
success factors were more or less as expected, for example the importance of 
language qualifications while others were not evident from the beginning, like the 
importance of avoiding a Russian partner.  
The aim of the research 
The energy resources of North-West Russia and their crown example as such, the 
giant gas field Shtokman; have raised interest in the area to almost cold war levels. 
Western oil companies and subcontractors are consequently interested in participating 
in the anticipated developments. Norwegian companies, with much experience from 
off-shore developments are naturally well-positioned as much of North-West Russia’s 
developments will be off-shore.   
 
Adding to this that Russia is a low-cost country with high and steady economic 
growth and a petroleum sector that will need investments of hundreds of billions of 
dollars over the next decades, the country has become a highly interesting 
internationalization target for the petroleum industry. The interest lies mainly in 
gaining a share of the Russian market, but also in the advantage of having a highly 
educated and relatively cheap work force that makes production establishments 
attractive.  
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The aim of the research is to shed light on which factors were important or even 
crucial for Reinertsen AS’ establishment of petroleum sub-supplier Reinertsen NWR 
in Murmansk. Our problem statement is:  
 
"What were the success factors for Reinertsen AS’ Foreign Direct Investment 
into the Russian petroleum sub-supplier market?" 
 
To answer this question we have collected data on Russia in historical, economic and 
cultural terms as well as data on the Norwegian petroleum sector, Reinertsen AS and 
subsidiary Reinertsen NWR.  
 
The theory on internationalization is wide and to a large degree varied. In order to 
provide a sufficient backbone for our analysis we will lead the reader through the 
most important contributions to this area of research. Since the data amount is large, a 
structure is needed for analytical purposes. We have developed a research model 
using Dunning’s (1973) eclectic internationalization theory as a centerpiece to 
scrutinize the different factors that together comprised the establishment of Reinertsen 
NWR.  
 
Dunning’s theory has been widely used as a tool to analyze Foreign Direct 
Investment. It focuses on Internal and External factors to explain what conditions 
have to be present in order to successfully undertake FDI. Furthermore, the advantage 
of maintaining control through internalizing business instead of using arms-length 
agreements stands central.  
 
Our research model consequently looks like this:  
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Figure 1: Our research model based on Dunning's eclectic theory 
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Outline of the thesis 
1. Methodology: The methodological concerns have covered the entire 
research process and it is natural to communicate them at the beginning 
of the thesis. In this way we present to the reader the fundamental ideas 
which have embraced our work.  
 
Frame of reference 
 
2. Cultural differences: The cultural chapter deals with cultural aspects 
in general before presenting specific Russian and Norwegian traits and 
business culture. The purpose to the chapter is to prepare the reader’s 
mind to the fact that an internationalization process involves venturing 
into psychologically unknown territory.  
 
3. Internationalization literature: The internationalization literature 
review leads the reader through the most common internationalization 
theories and approaches. We elaborate on our main choice of theory; 
Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm before knitting up the chapter by including 
different theoretical approaches in a coherent manner to form an eclectic 
research model.  
 
Background 
 
4. Russia: In order for the reader to understand the context in which 
Reinertsen NWR operates we present a brief history of Russia up until 
today including the post-soviet economic development. The historical 
background is also relevant in the sense that it provides the reader with a 
reference for the cultural aspects discussed: Many cultural traits have 
their background from Communism and earlier and might be hard to 
fathom without knowledge of their background. 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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5. The Petroleum Industry: After a brief global overview, this chapter 
introduces the reader to the Norwegian petroleum industry from which 
Reinertsen AS gained its broad petroleum sector experience. Further we 
elaborate on the Russian petroleum industry, discussing the Shtokman 
hype and showing that Russia and North-West Russia present numerous 
opportunities besides Shtokman for Norwegian companies.  
 
6. Reinertsen AS and Reinertsen NWR: This is the data gathered from 
interviews with the managers of the respective companies, presented as a 
coherent story to make it interesting reading.  
 
 
7. Analysis: This chapter ties together the frame of reference, the 
background and the data gathered in the case study within the frame of 
our research model. Utilizing theory and previous research on culture 
and internationalization to structure and shed lights on bits and pieces of 
data, we manage to draw at least some conclusions that challenge 
common opinions on success factors of business internationalization and 
how to establish oneself in Russia.  
 
Further Research Issues: Here we give a brief suggestion of fields of 
study where further research is needed.
6 
7 
5 
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1. METHODOLOGY: Scientific Method 
 
In this chapter we will introduce some definitions of the term method and explain how 
we understand the concept. Further we will discuss our science philosophical 
perspective which is within the tradition of social constructivism. We will present to 
the reader different methodological questions and defend the choices we have made in 
our work.  
 
1.1. What is methodology? 
Method derives from the Greek word methodos which means to hodos. In plain 
English: The road to a goal. Methodology is the way method is used, a description of 
the technique that is used in a given science. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002; 31) gives a 
more practical definition: “Methodology: Combination of techniques used to enquire 
into a specific situation”. To put it even more practically, methodology is about 
gathering, systemizing, analyzing and interpreting data.  
1.2. Methodological anchoring 
Methodological anchoring concerns itself with the way the researcher views the 
world. This might sound a bit vague. To put it simple no one has a monopoly on the 
truth. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) say that since the researcher in many cases may 
influence the object of research, interference is an important issue. The way the 
researcher views the world will inevitably affect the research. Therefore it will be 
valuable for the reader to know the science philosophical standing of the researcher. 
Our standing is within the social constructivist tradition. Meaning is constructed 
through social interaction. That means that we see social and economical 
phenomenon, not as objective realities separated from the consciousness of people, 
but as meaningful phenomenon that changes character, that become something 
different if we change the way we look upon them (Nyeng, 2004:137). 1 
                                                 
1 Take for instance the delicious food Monkfish. Up until the 1990’s the catch was seen as waste. All 
fishermen knew that the ugly looking fish was nothing to keep, and threw it over board. Today, on the 
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1.2.1. Ontology / Epistemology 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) say that ontology is the way we view the world, the 
perception of reality. Philosophers have discussed this for centuries. What is reality? 
 
Epistemology is the way we communicate information and findings. What can we 
know? What is true? How true can we claim the findings in our thesis to be? The 
known German writer Thomas Mann once said: “A great truth is a truth whose 
opposite is also a truth”. Mann’s statement may serve as an entry to the social 
constructivist world view. There is no universal truth. Economics and business have a 
fairly short history compared to traditional sciences such as physics and chemistry. 
But even in the natural sciences, where concrete objects are investigated, we have 
seen the splitting of what was unsplitable, the atom. New discoveries constantly 
change our world view. Speaking of science, it might be a digression to address faith, 
but the mere fact that thousands of religions exist is a token that truth varies, from 
person to person, from time to time and from place to place.  
 
May (1994; 11) paraphrases Schults and Meleis (1988) in her article on abstract 
knowledge. ”If we agree that there are different ways of knowing, different unknowns 
to be known, different propensities of knowers for knowing and different aspects to be 
known about the same phenomenon, then perhaps we can develop appropriate criteria 
for knowing from what we do know, and then, for knowing what we want to know.” 
 
This somewhat peculiar quote shows that it is simply impossible to unveil cause and 
effect behind everything. The social constructions are simply too complex. But it is 
certainly allowed to try!   
1.2.2. The authors’ background & methodological anchoring  
During our studies in Energy Management we have had traditional courses within 
economics, business and administration, but also courses oriented more towards social 
science. The course in methodology also gave interesting glimpses of theory, such as 
complexity theory. Furthermore the authors have lived and studied in Russia’s two 
                                                                                                                                            
contrary, Monkfish is a delicacy and consequently very valuable catch. Still, many older people refuse 
to eat it. Reality changes according to the eyes of the beholder.  
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largest cities and gained first hand knowledge to Russian society and business world. 
We feel that our background is suitable to illuminate our problem complex in a good 
way.   
 
Still, we realize that it will not be easy, and we will not be able to reach an objective 
truth, neither concerning Russia nor Reinertsen NWR. The complexity surrounding 
establishing businesses makes it hard to break down processes and individual 
occurrences to simple concepts. It is hard to unveil the course of even simple 
occurrences, as cultural differences, hidden agendas, announced agendas, power 
games and conflicts of interest interact to create a measurable result (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2002). What we will do is provide the reader with an overall understanding of 
Reinertsen NWR’s establishing in Murmansk. We will do this by shedding light on 
and scrutinize factors that have played or may have played a role in the process.  
 
The role of being a researcher is new to us both. We have written many assignments 
and papers previously, and have had several courses in methodology. In former 
assignments scientific philosophical issues have been left little concern. Now, 
embarking on the largest research project we have ever done, a master thesis, we 
realize that consciousness regarding our philosophical standing will have a positive 
impact on the result of our research. Throughout the process we have discussed how 
society and intra-social communication vary between Norway and Russia. We have 
been aware of what Nyeng (2004) says, that the reality is a social construction and the 
human is a bearer of its meaning.  
1.3. Scientific Approach – Methods 
Kotler (2000) claims there are 5 important stages that a research project must go 
through in order to yield the best possible result. We will discuss these stages closer in 
this chapter.  
  
 1. Formulating research questions  
 2. Choosing a research design  
 3. Collecting data  
 4. Analyzing data  
 5. Reporting  
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1.3.1. Stage 1 - Formulating research questions 
In the beginning, we set out to do a comparative case study of Norwegian petroleum 
business establishments into North-West Russia. It soon became apparent that despite 
huge political and academic interest in the area, not many companies have chosen to 
establish themselves in the area. After a few conversations with people who knew the 
area well, we found that there was a lack of serious and resourceful actors entering the 
market. A recurring name in these conversations was Reinertsen NWR, which had not 
only established itself in the area, but was in a short time making a profit. Why were 
they successful, we wondered? After a few more discussions among the authors and 
with other counselors we basically had two options: 1. Look into why so many 
business initiatives in Russia failed, or 2. Find out what had made Reinertsen NWR a 
success. With a desire to highlight possibilities instead of obstacles, we ended up 
choosing the latter as a question for our research.  
 
Thus we have chosen to focus on a single case, Reinertsen NWR. We want to look 
into the company to see which factors have contributed to their unprecedented success 
in North-West Russia. But a business establishment is not only affected by the 
internal factors. The external factors will to a great degree affect the process, and in an 
unknown environment the knowledge of and degree of control over these factors may 
be crucial. To broaden the picture and paint a background for our case we have delved 
into Russia, painting a background picture of an environment that is sometimes very 
different from Norway. In order to do this properly we have leaned on our own 
knowledge from living in and studying Russia, we have talked to Russian and 
Norwegian experts on North-West Russia and studied the media and previous 
research.   
1.3.2. Stage 2 - Forming a research design 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) say that a research design is organizing the research 
activity, including data gathering in a way that most likely to achieve the aim of the 
researcher. Developing a good design that is suitable for a given research problem 
requires taking a stand on several issues such as scientific approach, sampling, which 
theory to use and presentation.  
Our research design will be descriptive. In the early phase we will do extensive 
literature searches within existing research on doing business in Northwest Russia. 
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This being a qualitative thesis, generalizability tends to be sacrificed for detail. 
Nevertheless we will allow room for basic quantitative data on Norwegian businesses 
establishing themselves in Russia and on the development of the Russian economical 
sector.  
Quantitative or qualitative method? 
Method means to proceed according to plan. But there is not a single method that is 
appropriate for all research questions. The method must be adapted to the tasks to be 
carried out and the research question (Nyeng, 2004).  
There are two main types of research. In quantitative methods statistical aides are 
used to analyze gathered data in the form of numbers (Nyeng, 2004). Qualitative 
method is based on data that can not be statistically treated, but must be verbally 
interpreted.  
 
Nyeng (2004; 195) presents some important issues when choosing a method:  
Ontology (How does the world look?)
Epistemology (Which knowledge can we obtain?)
Method (How do we proceed to obtain this knowledge?
Qualitative Quantitative
Inductive approach
Focus on the whole
Closeness
Words
Deductive approach
Focus on parts / individuals
Distance
Numbers
  
Figure 2: Quantitative and qualitative methods (Nyeng, 2004) 
 
The qualitative method is well suited for social constructionist research since it sees 
these phenomena as results / constructions of social interaction (Easterby-Smith et al. 
2002).  
This method is clearly favorable to our research question where we seek to understand 
a single case in a complex and sometimes unknown environment.  
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Qualitative methods 
A definition of qualitative methods is ”a selection of explaining techniques seeking to 
decode, translate  and otherwise understand the meaning, not the frequency of more or 
less naturally present phenomena in the social world” (Van Maanen, 1983;9). One is 
in other words concerned with explaining and interpreting phenomena and gives an 
account of these interpretations as organized text (Nyeng, 2004).  
 
This makes it more dangerous to generalize findings. Instead phenomena are studied 
in-depth. Qualitative research is in other words highly context dependent. Techniques 
associated with qualitative methods are:   
• Interviews 
• Observation 
• Diary 
 
It is difficult to pre-test qualitative methods. That makes it especially important to 
have a well considered research design already from the start. Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2002) say that in order to create a good research design one must be in the clear 
concerning the overall aims of the research. Our research seeks to uncover which 
experiences the Norwegian company Reinertsen AS gained when establishing 
themselves in Russia. We want to unveil their motivation for doing what they did, 
their future plans and strategies. For instance a questionnaire would be poorly suited 
for this undertaking. We must uncover which thoughts and reflections the 
management of Reinertsen have made them selves during this process. In order to do 
this, we traveled to Murmansk and interviewed the management there. We also 
interviewed central managers at Reinertsen’s main office in Trondheim. In addition to 
that, to better our understanding of the surroundings Reinertsen NWR operates in we 
have interviewed and sought advice from several experts, Russian and Norwegian 
ones, on entrepreneurship and the oil and gas sector in Russia.  
Types of data 
One distinguishes between two main types of data: Secondary and primary.  
 
• Secondary data is gathered by someone other than the researcher and is 
usually gathered for another purpose (Jacobsen, 2002). Our secondary data 
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typically were annual reports, Norwegian, Russian and international media, 
publications from public and private organizations and other research. It is 
especially important to ensure the quality and reliability of secondary data. For 
example, relying on random internet sources may seriously weaken reliability. 
To strengthen reliability we relied on quality controlled databases, 
publications from respected organizations and authors and inevitably the 
media. Data from media sources are generally newer than other secondary 
data, which is advantageous.  
 
• Primary data is gathered by the researcher. It is always connected to the actual 
project. As mentioned above, we collected our primary data through 
interviews and conversations with Russian and Norwegian experts and 
representatives from Reinertsen. The advantage of primary data is that they’re 
tailored to the research question and that the researcher has much greater 
control over validity and reliability than with secondary data (Jacobsen, 2000). 
The backside of using primary data is that it may be difficult to access relevant 
sources, and that their collection is much more resource demanding in terms of 
money as well as time. The main bulk of our data gathering work were 
consequently associated with primary data conducting interviews and 
conversations.  
Sampling – units of analysis 
Our unit of analysis, or case, is Reinertsen NWR. We looked at the process of 
establishing the company in relatively unknown surroundings in Murmansk. To do 
this, we mapped the specific actions taken and talked to managers in order to reveal 
the thoughts and intentions behind these actions. Reinertsen NWR’s establishment is 
not far away in time, and all outcomes of the internationalization process are not yet 
certain, like attracting more Russian customers. March et al. (1991) write about 
learning from samples of one or fewer, which is what many organizations are forced 
to do, for instance an airline learning to prevent airplane crashes without actually 
experiencing them. They claim that meager experience can be converted into 
interpretations of history by experiencing events richly. They claim that as 
organizations are undergoing processes, the management gains experience and learn 
from them before the outcome of the processes becomes apparent. In the case 
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Reinertsen NWR some outcomes are apparent, while others are not. Nevertheless it is 
valuable to find what the management has learnt in the course of the 
internationalization process, what their experiences have been and how their decisions 
have been affected.  
 
We have also seen those actions and decisions against their context, such as rules and 
regulations, cultural codes and commercial considerations. In order to do this we 
gathered data from experts that have excellent knowledge on the business climate and 
energy sector in Russia.  
Experts – creating a backdrop 
The Norwegian experts come from organizations and companies within consulting 
and industry development and the petroleum sector. Talking to one expert, we have 
been led to others and the selection of experts has grown in the process. This random 
method of choosing a sample that Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) calls “snowball 
sampling” has the advantage that we throughout the process have remained open to 
contributions from new sources. The disadvantage of the selection method is that the 
sample might be biased, that the respondents are not representative for the population.  
From the Russian side we have mainly used what Ghauri (2002) calls a “convenience 
sample”, that is we have used experts we know or have heard about from our studies 
in Russia. The disadvantage of this method is again that the sample might be biased. 
We feel however that gaining access to sources otherwise hard to gain access to more 
than makes up for the possibility that their opinions might be biased.  
1.3.3. Stage 3 – Collecting Data 
Phase 1 – Secondary data 
We both have very good background knowledge regarding the Russian financial 
sector. From our studies in Russia we have a growing interest and understanding of 
Russian business culture. We pay close attention to Russian media and have a broad 
Russian network. We have also researched literature on Russia and Russian 
conditions as well as theory within internationalization and networking. This has all 
been important to understanding our problem area.  
Phase 2 – interviews with experts 
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Having built an understanding of the practical and theoretical problem area, we 
wanted to find out more on how a business goes about when establishing itself in 
Russia. What deciding factors must be considered? This might be challenges in 
international cooperation, cultural obstacles and general obstacles to do business in 
the area.  
 
In order to clarify these important questions we spoke with Norwegian and Russian 
experts. In his way we have covered both the Russian and Norwegian perspectives, 
which we find strengthens the reliability of the thesis.  
 
In this phase we consulted the following experts:  
 
Norwegian perspectives:  Kåre Storvik2 
Geir Reiersen3 
Thor Christian Andvik4  
Russian perspectives:  Dmitri Teryakhin5  
Marat Bagautdinov6 
    Alexey Fadeev7 
Phase 3 – In-depth interviews with Reinertsen management 
We interviewed Torkild Reinertsen, President for Reinertsen AS and Svein Grande, 
manager for Reinertsen NWR.  
 
An interview is, in the right sense of the word an inner picture of the interview object 
(Chirban, 1996; XI). Yin (1994) mentions three types of interviews: The open 
interview, the focused interview and the structured interview, resembling a survey in 
form. Our interview with Svein Grande was a focused interview according to Yin’s 
                                                 
2 Kåre Storvik is the owner and founder of Sherpa Consult, a company that consults businesses on 
Russia.  
3 Geir Reiersen works in SivaTech as International Project Manager. He has many years of experience 
from Murmansk and North West Russia.  
4 Thor Christian Andvik is the Statoil representative to the Murmansk based oil-business supplier 
organisation Murmanshelf. 
5 Dmitri Teryakhin has written a paper on the petroleum development in Russia. His study on the NWR 
gas-sector was published in the journal Geopolitics of Energy. He works for a major Russian oil 
company.  
6 Marat Bagautdinov works in Moscow for an international consulting company. 
7 Alexey Fadeev is the Director Murmanshelf.  
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(1994) classification. It was open, with a pre-determined set of questions that were 
formed with background in the data gathered in phases one and two.  
 
Legard et al. (2003) say that an in-depth interview is supposed to combine structure 
with flexibility. The interview was based on an interview guide giving which main 
subjects and questions that had to be covered in the course of the conversation. We let 
the interview to flow as a conversation in order to make the interview object feel at 
ease and produce meaning freely. Our interview guide was therefore according to 
Trost’s (1993) guidelines, compact with wide areas of interest. Within these areas of 
interest we were free to improvise and when necessary ask questions within the 
context of the conversation.  
 
Chirban (1996) claims that interview situations that do not consider the interplay and 
dynamics between interviewer and interviewee will be inefficient and lifeless. We 
started the interview quite informally, discussing this and that. Common experience 
from Russia made it easier for us to become familiar with the interviewee, 
strengthening the likelihood of getting good and relevant data. Both authors have 
good knowledge to Russia and although we chose to have one main interviewer and 
note-taker we were able to supplement each other.  
 
One of Trost’s (1993) most important pieces of advice is “Do not claim, ask!” That is 
a very good point, and in all our conversations and interviews we have paid close 
attention to avoid leading questions that might make the interviewee express our 
views and beliefs. We have also in line with Trost’s (1993) advice kept the 
introductory phase neutral.  
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) say that it can be difficult to assess whether vital 
information is accessed in an interview. The interviewee might retain information on 
purpose, or she could be the wrong person to talk to without wanting to admit it. In 
retrospect we see that the interviews with representatives from Reinertsen and 
Reinertsen NWR have uncovered vital and useful information, especially concerning 
strategic choices and with regards to inter-corporate networks. Most experts have also 
been refreshingly open-hearted and all in all we experienced only a single interview in 
which we felt that a somewhat paradisiacal reality was presented. Easterby-Smith et 
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al. (2002) further say that the chemistry between interviewer and interviewee may 
impair the quality of data. The chemistry between the authors and the interviewees 
has been very good. We have acted professionally and enthusiastic and met 
enthusiasm in return. Finally, we have kept in mind the social constructivist issues. 
Meaning and message are first constructed between the interviewee and the authors 
and then between the authors and the reader (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). If we have 
felt that anything was unclear we have asked again. We have been honest and 
straightforward in our account of events and have sought to express ourselves as 
plainly as possible.   
 
Using several different sources, secondary as well as primary, we have triangulated 
data. We have Russian expert’s views, Norwegian expert’s views, subjective and 
more objective views regarding Reinertsen NWR. Triangulation strengthens the 
likelihood that we will get a balanced account from and picture of our case (Ghauri 
and Grønnhaug, 2002). 
1.3.4. Phase 4 – Analyzing data 
In many student papers theory becomes and appendix to the thesis, standing alone and 
fragmented from the rest of the work. Theory is seen as necessary, but the students 
often experience difficulty tying theory to the actual research (Elnan, 2000). This has 
been a challenge to our work. It has been hard to find a supervisor with the ideal 
theoretical background that had time to guide us. Still, we mean that the theoretical 
framework presented, convey a multifaceted view of the internationalization process 
and different factors that influence it. Consequently, the theoretical basis for analysis 
is good.  
 
Gathering data we have been aware that there is no clear distinction between 
gathering and analysis of data (Easterby-Smith, 2002). Perhaps the greatest advantage 
of writing in a group is that we have had the opportunity to discuss findings as they 
occurred. We are both very much involved in the research topic. Both find Russia 
fascinating, and are interested in politics, business and energy issues. That strengthens 
our analysis.   
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The biggest challenge when conducting qualitative research is perhaps to 
communicate the meaning and message that the gathered data hide. Easterby-Smith et 
al. (2002) say that this demands both clear explanations and examples on how raw 
data have been transformed into meaningful conclusions. We have clearly given all 
respondents and their background, and who expressed which opinions. We have 
presented our research model, showing the process or flow from data, via theory and 
analysis to a conclusion.   
 
Furthermore we have been conscious that it is important to do other things besides the 
thesis. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) give several examples that in order to preserve 
creativity it is important to maintain curiosity and interest in other professional 
disciplines. Some periods have been pretty intense, while other times we have 
prioritized to do other things before returning to the thesis. 
Trustworthiness– Validity and reliability 
Validity is simply put the ability of a test or instrument to actually measure the object 
of the measurement (Paraphrased from Zaltmann et al. in Ghauri et al., 2002; 70).  
 
Reliability can be defined as the ability of a test or an instrument to produce the same 
result from several tests under identical circumstances. The social world is however 
not a clinical laboratory, but is constantly changing. Consequently reliability is hard to 
obtain in social constructivist research, since circumstances will not be identical for 
several tests.  
 
Since the very goal of research is to be able to claim something on a more certain 
basis that everyday observations, reliability and validity are of crucial importance. 
There are many things we “know” to be true, but in order to prove or test these 
allegations scientifically we must pay constant attention to validity and reliability 
throughout the research process (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  
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Validity and reliability in qualitative research 
The demands to validity and reliability will be different according to whether one 
works quantitatively or qualitatively and according to the researcher’s philosophical 
standing. Some also claim that using these quantitative concepts in qualitative 
research (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). In positivist tradition where quantitative 
methods are preferred, a universal reality is sought unveiled where the results from 
one test can be applied to similar situations. One seeks regular and causal connections. 
Within qualitative methods a different approach is chosen. Different perspectives and 
transparency in choice of methods and design is meant to indicate the justifiable 
degree of generalization (Easterby-Smith, 2002).  
 
To attribute validity and reliability to social constructionist research might indicate the 
acceptance of an absolute (positivist) reality (Easterby-Smith, 2002). Still there is no 
denying that qualitative research has become more common. Therefore it is important 
to ensure the research’s validity in order to make it credible. The reader, looking for 
information on how to establish oneself in Russia, might find the focus on 
methodology tiresome. The purpose behind this detailed description is however to 
ensure that we end at a credible result. Norèn (1995) supports this view, claiming that 
thorough description of the construction of the knowledge must be shown to claim 
credibility. We have shown how we conducted the interviews and where we found 
other data. We have explained the theoretical framework, the analytical process and 
led the reader along on the road to meaningful conclusions. Important appendixes 
such as the interview guide, maps and figures are presented.  
Case studies 
No common understanding of what a case is exists. Jacobsen (2000) says that a case 
study is a good approach when one seeks a deeper understanding of a certain 
occurrence limited in time and space. Yin (1994) says that the case study is a 
preferred approach when answering questions like “whom” and “why”. This is all 
applicable to our research which is limited to Reinertsen NWR in the phase of setting 
up business in Russia. We seek for example to find “why” they did what they did, 
“who” were motivators, decision makers and “who” they consulted?  
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Many variables and factors play a role in the process of setting up a business. For 
instance the local authorities will involve themselves in a different way than in 
Norway, forces within Reinertsen and in Reinertsen’s expanded network may be 
significant and even high-level politics and politicians. Case studies are useful when 
the research phenomenon is hard to study out of its natural context and when the 
phenomenon and its variables are difficult to quantify. Often, many variables must be 
taken into consideration, something which makes other methods difficult to use (Yin, 
1994).  
 
Our goal is to achieve and convey an understanding of Reinertsen’s business venture 
into Russia. We do not want to compare several business establishments or generalize 
to a broader selection. We will analyze Reinertsen’s choices by looking at factors that 
affected those choices with the final goal to come to a conclusion regarding why their 
establishment has been successful. A relevant objection here might be that it would be 
interesting to compare more businesses than one. We do to a certain extent agree, but 
the fact that North West Russia is an emerging market makes it hard to find similar 
petroleum sector cases to compare. For those interested in reading about 
internationalization to Russia on a more general basis, several formers student papers 
on the subject can be found in HBO’s library. Our research becomes part of this 
tradition and takes it a step further, actually analyzing someone who did establish 
themselves, instead of looking at how it can be done.  
Generalization 
Lincoln and Cuba (2002; 27) say concerning case studies: “The only generalizable 
fact is that one can not generalize”. We have also mentioned above that it is disputed 
whether qualitative research may be generalized. Reinertsen AS distinguishes itself in 
many ways from other Norwegian actors in North West Russia. It is one of Norway’s 
largest suppliers to the petroleum business. The company has large resources 
concerning capital, technology and competence. Therefore our findings will not be 
directly applicable to smaller companies seeking to establish themselves in North-
West Russia.  
Still, the thesis presents a relevant picture of today’s Russian business climate. We 
explain how Reinertsen has approached the magnitudous task of establishing 
themselves in Murmansk and what they learnt underway. Many of these bits and 
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pieces can be useful to smaller businesses. Here the term transferability is central. It is 
different from the term generalizability in that not the whole, but only elements of the 
research can be transferred to other “appropriate” situations (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985).  
1.3.5. Phase 5 - Reporting 
Form 
Before we start reporting, we must decide who our target group is and what the 
purpose of the thesis is (Ghauri and Grønnhaug, 2002). This thesis is a master’s thesis, 
something which sets forth various requirements as to form. The thesis must be 
detailed and clearly express how we arrived at a final result. Our target group, besides 
counselors and censor, is Reinertsen AS and others interested in the process of 
establishing business in Russia. This is a potentially diverse target group, it is 
therefore important that the paper makes interesting reading also to those not too 
familiar with Russia or internationalization theory.  
 
We have put much emphasis on defining uncommon terms and otherwise make the 
thesis as readable as possible. A thesis shall ideally be clear, to the point, coherent, 
lively, exciting, meaningful and free from pedantry (Sekaran, 1992; Rubin and Rubin, 
1995. Paraphrased from Ghauri and Grønnhaug, 2002).Now you might want to object 
that a reference taking up an entire line certainly is somewhat pedantic. It is however 
crucial in order for the thesis to have research value that referencing and other 
unalterable requirements are followed.  
Findings 
Here we present the empirical data we found. This section is the centerpiece around 
which the other sections are constructed. We have divided the section into smaller 
parts, focusing on Russia in general, the business climate Russia, Reinertsen AS, 
Reinertsen NWR, the Norwegian and Russian petroleum industry and so forth. We 
wanted to create an interesting and relevant story on Russia today. This chapter is 
highly relevant, as it presents a snapshot of the situation as of today and may very 
well be read independently from the other chapters.  
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Analysis 
Here we evaluate and discuss the facts that were presented in the background and case 
study chapters. We explain what may be transferable8 to other, appropriate situations. 
We recapitulate theoretical issues and empirical data to present a coherent analysis of 
the different factors that together constitute Reinertsen NWR.  
1.4. Strengths and limitations of the thesis 
A weakness in one aspect may be a strength in another aspect. We initially wanted to 
do a comparative study, but ended up doing a single-case study. Arguably a weakness 
of the thesis may be the specificity of the research object. That will make it difficult to 
generalize and draw parallels to other situation. This weakness becomes a strength 
however, taking the detail level of the research into consideration. One detailed 
account may be more valuable than several more superficial accounts, which would 
have been the case had we been in a position to expand the research to other objects.  
Reinertsen has used much resource on their establishment in Russia. We appreciate 
their foresight in that they are willing to share their experiences on a detailed level. 
Clearly, this thesis contains much valuable information that can be applied to smaller 
actors looking at the Russian market.   
 
We are both very up to date on current affairs in Russia. We also have a strong 
interest in the Russian petroleum sector and Russia as a place for doing business. We 
read a lot about Russia, both in the media as well as history and social science. We 
have lived in Russia and are in a position to comment on cultural and systematical 
differences from Norway.  
 
The anthropologists Goodenough (1970) and Harris (1980) talk about emic and etic 
types of data. The term etic is used to refer to the detached observer’s view, while the 
term emic is used to refer to the view of a participant. Scientists interested in the local 
construction of meaning, and local rules for behavior, will rely on emic accounts; 
scientists interested in facilitating comparative research and making universal claims 
will rely on etic accounts. Although our main goal is not to make universal claims, but 
to uncover and communicate the local construction of meaning, our wide background 
                                                 
8 See the paragraph on Case Studies above, on the term transferability.  
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knowledge is strengthening the thesis in the way that we can be seen both as actors in 
and as observers of the Russian society. 
1.5. Ethical considerations 
Ethical codes are aimed at preventing serious and unambiguous cases of abuse and 
most of the ethical issues the researcher faces are small-scale, incremental and 
ambiguous. Therefore researchers should be thinking, reflective and prepared to ask 
difficult questions (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). Asking the difficult questions is not 
easy, especially if the chemistry between interviewer and interviewee is poor. This is 
an important ethical consideration for this thesis, and something which has the 
potential to seriously affect both validity and reliability.  
 
Russia is no place for little boys or girls. It has been a real possibility that we could 
stumble upon information that could be ethically questionable. If so, given it was 
relevant, would we present it in our work? Still no such incidents occurred. Even if 
they would, have, something we doubt, it would not have mattered much if we made 
it public. Our credibility as researchers is not strong.  
 
Another similar consideration goes on the role of the qualitative researcher and the 
ease of adapting research data deliberately or unconsciously to make the findings 
more interesting9 (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). It is not easy to decide what to leave 
out and what to include in the work and how to interpret it.  
                                                 
9Take for instance the Sudbø case, where a medical researcher deliberately manipulated data in order to 
arrive at groundbreaking conclusions. In qualitative research, such data manipulation is hard to test, 
and perhaps even more tempting.  
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Summary 
In this chapter we have discussed the methodological approach to our research. We 
have elaborated on our philosophical standing clarifying that different people will see 
things differently according to their background and world view. We have gone 
through Kotler’s 5 stages of successful research, explaining our approach in 
formulating a research question, making a research design, collecting, analyzing and 
presenting data. The issues validity, reliability and generalizability have been 
elaborated upon to communicate what makes this thesis valid research. Finally we 
have discussed briefly strengths and limitations of the thesis as well as ethical 
considerations.  
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Frame of reference 
 
The purpose of these two chapters is to provide a brief overview of the literature on 
internationalization research. We also provide definitions of and present important 
issues regarding cultural aspects.  
This part of the thesis, leading ultimately to our research model, will serve as the 
theoretical frame of reference for discussion and analysis of Reinertsen’s success in 
their establishment in Murmansk.  
 
2. Cultural Differences 
In the 19th century, the term culture was commonly used as a synonym for Western 
civilization. The rest of the world was often seen as barbarians or savages by 
westerners considering their own culture superior. But also the Eastern culture, the 
Asian, the Arabic and others thought their culture was superior (Jandt, 2004). So, who 
were right, and is there a tool to measure which culture is most superior? 
2.1. Is it possible to understand Russia? 
 
Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma 
-Sir Winston Churchill 
 
Russia has a population of around 140 million comprised of more than 100 ethnical 
groups (Smetanina, 2006). The vast geographical and regional differences imply the 
relative heterogeneity of the Russian population. That makes it hard to generalize to 
Russia as a whole. Nevertheless the Soviet period has to a large degree affected the 
“manner” of the Soviet citizen. Thus Russians and for that matter other former Soviet 
republics share a common Soviet past, making them more homogenous as a group 
(Smetanina, 2006). The authors agree with this. Having been part of a group 
comprised of people from among other Russia, Chechnya, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
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Ukraine and Turkmenistan we found that they to a large degree shared similar views 
and opinions.  
 
Unlike the western part of the world Russia does not have a democratic tradition. 
Historically, Russia was ruled by the Mongolians from 1240 to 1480, the Tsar regime 
after that and finally by Communists from 1917 to 1991. Russia did not, like Europe, 
take part in the Renaissance or the Age of Enlightenment. At that time they were too 
busy slaving for the Tsar. The Russian farmers were legally the landowner’s property 
until 1861 and in practice even longer. This led to a vertical authoritarian social 
system with a poor basis for development of society and organizational diversity  
(Hønneland & Jørgensen, 2006). Despite educating the population and egalitarian in 
theory, the Soviet Union was also an authoritarian and in periods totalitarian state. 
These factors have, as we will show, all affected the Russian culture.   
2.2. The complexity of culture 
Knowing another culture’s complexity helps you understand the opportunities and 
challenges that this culture possesses. But we can have no direct knowledge of a 
culture other than our own. Our experience with, and knowledge of other cultures is 
forever limited by the perceptual bias of our own culture. “An adult Canadian will 
never fully understand the experience of growing up an Australian” (Jandt, 2004: 8). 
Similarly it is difficult for someone from Trondheim to understand how it is to grow 
up in Murmansk, not to speak of growing up in Murmansk during Communism. 
Although the geographical distance is not great, the psychological distance certainly is 
considerable.  
 
To begin to understand a culture, you need to understand all the experiences that 
guide its individual members through life. Language and gestures, personal 
appearances and social relationship; religion, philosophy and values; courtship, 
marriage, and family customs; food and recreation; work and government; education 
and communication systems; health, transportation, and government systems; and 
economic systems play a role. Think of culture as everything you need to know and 
do so as not to stand out as a “stranger” in a foreign land. Culture is not a genetic trait. 
All these cultural elements are learned through interaction with others in the culture 
(Jandt, 2004).  
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It is important to have in mind that inside cultures you find subcultures, co-cultures 
and subgroups (Jandt, 2004). A subculture may represent a large number of people 
based on economic and social class, ethnicity, race or geographic region. A co-culture 
may be seen as a culture which different from the main culture but not less superior. 
They may have their own language, own practices and so on, for example the 
American Indians or our own Sámi people. A subgroup may include doctors, police 
officers, customs services, and employees of large organization such as Statoil or 
Gazprom. 
2.3. Hofstede’s 5 cultural dimensions 
A person’s thought and action pattern is related to the cultural context the person 
belongs to (Hofstede, 2003). The famous sociologist Geert Hofstede’s (2003) five 
cultural dimensions gives a better understanding for understanding the differences in 
management practices across cultures. From a comprehensive study on how values in 
the workplace are influenced by culture, covering more than 70 countries, Hofstede 
developed a model that identifies 5 primary dimensions to assist in differentiating 
between cultures. The dimensions which are widely used to understand cultural 
difference are as follows:  
• Power Distance 
Defines the degree of acceptance in an organization or country of unequal 
distribution of power.  
• Collectivism / Individualism 
On the other side of individualism are collectivism. This dimension defines the 
degree to which individuals are integrated into groups or act as individuals.  
• Masculinity / Femininity 
Hofstede found that women’s values are more equal between cultures than 
those of men. Men range from being modest and caring on one side to being 
assertive and competitive on the other side. Women on the other hand seem to 
be more alike across cultures.  
• Uncertainty Avoidance 
Indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either 
uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. It ranges between for 
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instance a totalitarian society where the one’s in power owns the truth and a 
more relativist society where different flows of opinions exist side by side.  
• Long-term Orientation 
Values associated with long-term orientation are perseverance and thrift. 
Respect for tradition, fulfilling social obligations and protecting one’s face is 
characterized as short-term values.  
Source: Hofstede (2003; 2007).  
 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions applied to Norway and Russia 
Country Power distance  Individualism Uncertainty avoidance Masculinity Long-term orientation 
Norway 31L 69M 50M 8L 20L 
Russia 95H 50M 90H 40L 10L 
Table 1: Overview of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions in Norway and Russia. 
Sources: Raghu (1988), Hofstede (2007) 
 
The table shows the differences between Norway and Russia. As expected, a much 
higher degree of power distance is accepted in Russia. That can perhaps be attributed 
to the authoritarian public power structures and to the hierarchical structures that are 
common both in public and private organizations. The historical background for this 
trait goes way back. For instance the concept “The good czar” implied the acceptance 
of farmers and poor people that the czar had indefinite power and he knew what was 
best. All bad things that happened were someone else’s fault. The wish for stability 
and growth in Russia stands strong. The authors have self found that the belief that a 
firm and powerful leader is needed to achieve that is very common among Russians. 
Many Russians, even today, mean that Stalin did a good job. He, according to them, 
the kind of leader the Soviet Union needed to keep the vast empire together.  
 
When it comes to individualism the index scores are close to each other. It seems that 
the heritage from Communism wasn’t rooted that deep, and that Russians are 
comfortable in a role both as individuals and in groups. Still, the score indicate that a 
Russian is willing to sacrifice more for the group than a Norwegian.  
 
Uncertainty avoidance is high in Russia. That implies that the search for a truth is 
common. The Soviet regime was a propaganda expert, spreading its truth effectively 
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through the Soviet Union via state controlled newspapers, television and the 
Communist Party. Religion, which was suppressed during Communism, has regained 
a strong position in Russia today. Also the fact that Russians prefer one strong leader 
shows itself through strong uncertainty avoidance. Most of the larger media in Russia 
today are once again centrally controlled, thus it is difficult for a common Russian to 
subscribe to any other truth than the government version. Nor is there widespread 
desire to seek other views.  
 
Russia is according to Hofstede’s classification not a very masculine country. Still it 
is more masculine than Norway and although most Russian women are occupied and 
have a visible society position, the men have the authority. The masculine orientation 
in business is shown in that a leader is supposed to be assertive and omniscient, never 
admitting to making errors (Swahn, 2002).  
 
Long-term orientation may be connected to individualism in some way. Anyway, we 
see that neither Norwegians nor Russians are especially concerned with social 
obligations and traditions. A reason for this may be that loyalty is generally not 
rewarded and that short-term gains are more favorable than long-term stability.  
 
In the end it must be noted that the Hofstede scores cannot be applied to a single 
individual. The reason we include this theory is that it says something about the 
general culture and mentality of a group and can in that way be useful to reflect over 
when meeting people from other belongings.   
2.4. Russian business culture 
 Reinertsen NWR is a Russian company located in Russia and with Russian 
employees. The customers are however not Russian and the demands for adhering to 
specifications are very strict. In order to maintain control over the business and satisfy 
strict demands, Reinertsen NWR’s manager is Norwegian.  
 
The role of the leader in Russia is fundamentally different from the role of the leader 
in Norway. Swahn (2002) gives many examples in her doctorate thesis on the 
differences between Russian and Norwegian business culture. While the leader in 
Norway is expected to cooperate with and facilitate the work of his colleagues, a 
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Russian leader is supposed to be an omniscient decision maker. It is often seen as a 
sign of weakness for a leader to seek the advice of colleagues below him in the 
hierarchy. The Russian business style is much more hierarchic and the leader is often 
not as involved in the everyday business of the company. The negative aspect of this 
is apparent: The leader, distanced from actual business, may make decisions on failing 
ground. In Norway he would most likely be corrected by his subordinates, while in 
Russia the subordinate will in many cases perform the work he has been told to do, 
regardless of whether or not he realizes that is not the best way to do things. In many 
cases, says Swahn (2002) the subordinate will perform work he knows to be wrong, 
since his boss told him to do it, something which, per definition, makes it correct.  
 
Swahn (2002) found that rules regulate a Russian workplace to a much larger degree 
than in Norway. To the confusion of foreigners many of those rules can be bent 
however. The application of rules depend on the objects relations to the rule giver and 
the position of the person regulated by the rule. The higher the position, the more the 
rules can be bent.  
 
The personal relation is given much more weight in Russia than in Norway and 
decision makers find it necessary to know each other on a personal level before 
committing to a deal. Once a contract has been signed it is seen as a guideline or an 
agreement of intention rather than set conditions and can be subject to informal 
changes.  
 
This can be viewed in connection with how planning is perceived in Russia. A 
Norwegian business meeting is a smooth, solution-oriented process towards a result. 
A Russian business meeting is more loosely structured and concerned with power 
distribution. It is also seen as important to take the word to be noticed. Eloquence and 
appeal on a personal level is appreciated (Swahn, 2002).  
 
Russians are more short-term minded than Norwegians and might not stick to a plan. 
Efficiency is not as in Norway seen as the ability to finish a task in a short time, but as 
the ability to reshuffle according to priorities. For instance, doing something for 
someone one has close personal relations to might be prioritized before an ongoing 
task (Swahn, 2002).  
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Swahn (2002) also elaborates on the Soviet heritage of Russian business life. Low 
service quality is seen as a result of working in formerly state-imposed jobs and no 
incentives to satisfy the customer. Business competence is generally low. During 
Soviet times terms such as “market planning” and “organizational development” did 
not exist in the Russian vocabulary. She also argues that a suspicion towards 
foreigners and money-makers or a combination of these is present.  The fear of being 
used is present. Paradoxically, at the same time the foreign business partner is 
expected to help in all situations where lack of knowledge or capital might pose a 
problem.  
 
Lastly Swahn (2002) shows that the idea of Russia as something unique is very much 
present: Russians feel that they have a special place in this world, unlike any others. 
Their nation is great in terms of resources and opportunities, but also in terms of 
difficulties. That also includes special challenges that can not be solved in an 
unrussian manner. Going to Russia as a “know it all” is the worst thing a foreigner can 
do, and he will be despised for it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
In this chapter we have provided some insights into the complexity of culture. WE 
learn that values are influenced by culture, also in the workplace. Through Hofstede’s 
5 cultural dimensions and Swahn’s (2002) studies on differences between Russian and 
Norwegian business cultures some of these values have been elaborated upon. 
Russians and Norwegians are in many cultural aspects noticeable different, something 
which in many cases lead to misunderstandings and conflict.  
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3. Internationalization literature 
 “In the new global economy, there is no place for companies to hide from foreign 
competitors - all companies need to plan for growth and survival in a world of 
global competition” 
-Franklin R. Root 
 
3.1. What is internationalization 
The concept of internationalization involves companies which exports goods and 
services, produces abroad, offers services towards foreign markets and so on. Welch 
and Luostarinen (1988) emphasize that internationalization is a process, which 
increases its involvement in a company’s international operations. They call this a 
“working definition”, but stress the importance of considering the process to be seen 
from both inside and outside the company. In relation to the company’s 
internationalization process, it is important to gain knowledge on the company’s 
internal processes (Framnes et al. 1997). The authors also stress that international 
success is connected to domestic success. If one succeeds at home it may be tempting 
to seek opportunities in new markets. Mcdougall & Oviatt (2000) see 
internationalization as the combination of innovative, proactive and risk willing 
behavior which crosses national borders and is meant to create value for the company. 
Black (2002) defines a MNC as a firm conducting business in more than one country, 
through branches or subsidiary companies.  
3.1.1. Why internationalize?  
There are many reasons for a company to internationalize. Many large firms are 
multinationals, and a considerable proportion of international trade is between 
multinationals and their own foreign branches or subsidiaries. While multinational 
operation presents some legal and organizational problems, many firms find it worth 
while. It brings them closer to suppliers and markets, they can take advantage of 
international differences in resources and costs, the benefits of research and 
development can be spread over wider markets, and it gives a wider spread of risks. 
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Multinational operation also improves their bargaining position in negotiating with 
national suppliers, governments, and trade unions. 
 
As an overall motive may be stated that companies which want to take part in an 
international market want to gain competitive advantages (Wheelen & Hunger, 1990). 
The internationalization literature categorizes the motivational factors leading to 
internationalization as either internal or external.  
 
Important internal stimuli: Excess capacity 
Unique product 
Strategic advantages – e.g. technology 
Marketing advantages 
The person of the decision maker 
Important external stimuli: Saturated home market / recession 
Better opportunities for rents 
Follow a customer’s internationalization process 
Follow competitors 
(Ahokangas, 1998; Delaney 1998, Hodne & Rosendahl, 2000).  
3.1.2. The person of the decision maker 
 To take part in the global market certain understanding is needed; an understanding 
that is reached by giving up the old way of thinking (Ohmae, 2000). Delaney (1998) 
says it is all about seeing things others do not see. It is not only about certain ways of 
doing things but also certain ways of thinking. To illustrate what qualities a manager 
should posses to have greatest possible opportunity to succeed, she lists up 12 points: 
1. You should like changes 
2. You should take new experiences with open mind, not only positive but also 
the negative crises 
3. You should be flexible, take risks and be innovative 
4. You should be willing to learn as much as possible about the new culture 
5. You should be energetic, patient and accept differences 
6. You should be comfortable with oneself 
7. You should be passionate, enthusiastic, playful and curious 
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8. You should have been in other cultures during longer periods, experienced it 
as the habitants and want to go back 
9. You should appreciate the concept of internationalization more than the trade 
itself 
10. You should have control over both big and small relations with the 
internationalization 
11. You should be inspired, and inspiring, team leader and leader 
12. You should have a great courage 
FRAME OF REFERENCE - INTERNATIONALIZATION 
                                                                
35 
 
3.2. Different perspectives on the internationalization 
process 
"... there is no consensus on empirical evidence as to which forces generate the 
process of internationalization or hold it back." 
- Jesper Strandskov  
According to Welch and Luostarinen’s (1988) definition, the traditional approaches 
towards internationalism imply that a company’s degree of internationalization can be 
determined on a scale that goes between a purely domestic and a fully 
internationalized company.  
 
There is no consensus regarding the forces that generate internationalization. There is 
however an abundance of literature on the subject of internationalization, applying 
different perspectives as a starting point of research. We present below the main 
features of the different perspectives towards the internationalization process. 
 
 
Figure 3: The development of and relationship between different perspectives on the process of 
internationalization (Ahokangas, 1998). 
 
Relationship between 
the perspectives 
Eclectic Perspective 
Learning and Innovation Perspective 
Network Perspective 
Resource-based Perspective 
Time and theory development 
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3.3. Learning and innovation adoption perspectives 
The Uppsala model which was developed by Johanson and Vahlne (1977) forms the 
basis of the learning perspective on internationalization. Their hypothesis is that 
competence is developed parallel to the internationalization process. It shows that 
many steps in the process occur as the commitment and investment in the foreign 
markets increase. At first the company has no export activities. In the next step the 
company becomes an exporter through an agent abroad. Then the company 
establishes sales outlets in the country. In the fourth and last step the company starts 
production in the country.  
 
According to the theory the company will start the internationalization process in a 
country or market not unlike the home market.  The low “psychic” distance between 
the home and abroad markets is supposed to yield greater possibilities than would 
have been the case entering a more unknown market. The company decreases the risk 
by operating in similar markets before entering the more dissimilar ones. Choice of 
market may come as a result of former experience. The direction and patterns of the 
internationalization process is influenced by the company’s strategies towards risk 
and uncertainty (Strandskov, 1995). 
 
 
Figure 4: Mechanisms for internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) 
 
Market  
Knowledge 
Market  
Commitment 
Commitment 
Decisions 
Current  
Activities 
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This dynamic model shows that market knowledge and market attachment affect both 
attachment decisions and the way decisions are taken at the moment. These will again 
change market knowledge and market attachment. The uncertainty surrounding the 
investment / commitment will be reduced when the company builds up knowledge 
around the new market. This is best done by activity and presence (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). Increased market knowledge leads to increased market attachment and 
vice versa. The incremental process which takes place is of a character that makes the 
company gain gradual experience and thereby gradual involvement in the market.  
3.3.1. Different types of knowledge 
It is important that the company makes the decision to invest in a foreign market on a 
foundation of knowledge and experience from the market, and that there are not any 
other alternative investment which will be more profitable (Andersen, 1993). The 
market knowledge may be divided into general and specific sections. Specific 
knowledge will be most important, since it reduces uncertainty and creates 
opportunities (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990).Specific knowledge is acquired through 
experience from the company’s activities in the market.  
Another division is between market and company experience. If the access to the 
“know how” is through external sources it is called market experience. For this 
experience to be related directly to the company, it is important that the person 
standing outside gains as much information as possible about the company. This 
makes it difficult for a company to use external consultancy in the internationalization 
process (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
3.3.2. Innovation related models 
According to these models, internationalization can be viewed as the learning process 
associated with the adoption of an innovation or a new idea. The idea of a process 
leading to more commitment and resources applied in the internationalization process 
is apparent. The difference from the learning perspectives is that the process is seen to 
be less dynamic. Instead of a dynamic model, Bamberger & Evers (1993) present an 
empirically based model showing that incremental steps take place, building 
internationalization experience and resources block by block.  
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Figure 5 Five-stage model of internationalization (Bamberger & Evers, 1993) 
 
In the first stage the company is domestically oriented. It has no interest in pursuing 
internationalization activities in the near future. In phase 2 the company envisages the 
opportunity of starting such operations, as a result of internal or external stimuli. The 
third stage is reached when a notion of the possibility of achieving rent by 
internationalizing is apparent in the company’s management. The fourth stage occurs 
with the increase of export operations and other establishments abroad. To reach this 
stage, the experiences from stage 3 must be positive and resources allocated to the 
internationalization effort must be sufficient. Stage five indicates that the company is 
committed to its foreign operations, which are seen as an integrated part of the 
company.  
 
In conclusion, the learning and innovation adoption models have been used to analyze 
both large and small companies. The focus of this perspective is the incremental 
nature of the internationalization process, be it cyclic, stage-based or evolutionary. A 
weakness with these models is that they describe the process of development, not the 
motivation and considerations behind it.  
Time 
International Involvement 
1        2           3          4          5 
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3.4. The network perspectives  
Johanson & Vahlne (1990) developed the Uppsala model further, applying a network 
perspective. Their work was developed among others by Johanson & Mattson (1988) 
and by Welch & Welch (1993) who put great emphasize on the network in the 
learning process. They claim that a company’s position in an international network is 
a result of the cumulative result of earlier network activities, formal as well as 
informal (Welch & Welch, 1993).  
 
According to Haugland (2004) there are four main motives for international company 
cooperation: 
1. Access to new international markets through cooperation with a local partner 
The advantage here is that you may gain access to local market knowledge and 
that you gain knowledge on how to best serve the market. In some markets the 
cooperation can also bring some form of extra legitimacy. 
2. A cooperation which gives access to existing companies’ distribution channels 
By connecting to a company with a developed distribution channel, you may 
find a way to avoid building up your own from scratch. One disadvantage may 
be that the access to market information can be somewhat limited and that you 
become very dependent on your partner. 
3. International subcontractor 
This is for companies which deliver components, input factors, semi-products 
and so on to customers using them in their own production. The products are 
usually specially fitted and the production happens in close contact with the 
customer. The company’s production processes often have to be carefully 
coordinated, which makes it unlikely that the customer change their sub- 
contractor.  
4. Cooperation for developing different package solutions and concepts 
If the company does not produce a whole package solution, one may join other 
producers. Together one therefore may deliver a total concept for the customer 
and thereby be more attractive. Internationally there is a clear tendency 
towards companies reducing the total amount of sub-contractors and rather 
trades with fewer whole package solution suppliers. 
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Anderson (2000) emphasizes personal networks as an important success criterion. 
Ford (1990) says that important information and contacts in international markets are 
often achieved through networks. Trough networks you may also increase the 
resource foundation and skill level. Haugland (2004) points out that cooperation 
between national and international companies may be a tool to succeed in a harder 
and more international competition. He further calls attention to the fact that a 
cooperation presents new organizational and leadership challenges for the 
management, of another character than for managing a solely internal 
internationalization effort. The process of managing cooperation is not always easy. 
Barringer and Harrison (2000) show in their studies that almost 50% of all co 
operations fail before the realization of the expectations, and in some cases as much as 
70% (Day, 1995). The risk in co operations is in other words found to be substantial.  
 
Perhaps the main idea behind the network perspective is that companies are 
interdependent, both in terms of cooperation and competition. Examples of important 
variables of analysis within this perspective are: What is the role of the company in 
relation to the other actors in the network? How important is the relationship? How 
strong is the relationship? In order to gain access to strategic resources, firms may co-
operate vertically, with respect to product flow, or horizontally with competitors, in 
other words, by entering into network relations (Ahokangas, 1998).  
The demands resting on the company is different according to what relative position it 
has in the network. Johanson & Mattsson (1988) developed a model of different 
situations a company can find itself in.  
Degree of internationalization of the 
network 
 
LOW HIGH 
LOW The Early Starter The Late Starter Degree of internationalization of 
the company HIGH The Lonely 
International 
The international 
among others 
Table 2: Internationalization and the network model: the situations to be analyzed (Johanson & 
Mattson 1988) 
 
The internationalization strategy of the company can be characterized by the need to 
1) minimize the need for knowledge development, 2) minimize the need for 
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adjustment, and 3) exploit established network positions (Johanson & Mattsson 
1988).These demands differ according to placement in the model.  
 
The case Reinertsen is classified either as an early starter (the first to establish itself in 
Russia) or a late starter (its competitors went to low-cost production areas before 
Reinertsen). The most relevant approach in our case is Reinertsen as the early starter, 
since it is more or less alone in Russia today.  
For the early starter these demands put a great deal of pressure on the company as it is 
the first to develop the network, and the cost of developing knowledge and adjusting 
its operations may be substantial. Quantitative resource adjustment is important to 
create the desired size of the subsidiary. Qualitative resource adjustment plays a role 
in allocating and developing knowledge where it is needed.  
 
A weakness of the network models in putting so much emphasize on the network 
aspect of internationalization is that strategic issues may be overlooked (Ahokangas, 
1998). In line with this the strong focus on the network limits recognition of the 
company as heterogenic. It has been empirically proved that the network may create 
the basis for the internationalization of the company, while further study on use of 
resources and strategy within this perspective is needed (Ahokangas, 1998).  
3.5. Resource based perspectives  
The resource based perspectives seek to develop adaptive and flexible resource based 
theory, focusing on sustainable and costly-to-copy attributes or resources of a 
company as the fundamental driver of the company’s competitive advantage 
(Ahokangas, 1998). A company’s ability to achieve and keep profitable market 
positions depends on its ability to gain and defend advantageous positions with regard 
to relevant resources important to the firm (Ahokangas, 1998). Intangible resources 
based on knowledge are important in the theories. The ability to learn and improve 
those intangible resources is also seen as a crucial factor. Tallman & Fladmoe-
Lindquist (1994) present a model where the internationalizing company is 
characterized by two factors: Resource availability and interest in capability 
development: 
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Figure 6: Resources, learning and MNCs (Tallman & F-Lindquist 1994) 
  
Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist (1994) put forth a view of internationalization as a 
rational process, since their model assume that strategies are determined according to 
available resources. Capability can also be seen as a resource, as different companies 
will have different capabilities for instance for learning. That will in turn affect the 
company’s performance.  
 
A company in Quadrant 4 is classified as a global multinational. It has departments in 
many different locations in a network structure. Although Reinertsen may be 
somewhat smaller than a Global MN, the situation is analog to their decentralized 
localization of engineering departments. At this level it is crucial to develop a 
capability for network-learning, otherwise performance will be poor. Tallman & 
Fladmoe-Lindquist’s (1994) places the company according to resources and 
capabilities. They explain what factors are important to consider at the different 
stages. They do not however explain a company’s development over time 
(Ahokangas, 1998).  
 
Hurry (1994) sheds more light on the internationalization process of the company. He 
claims that the firm’s strategies are determined by the resources at hand and the 
Quadrant 1. National Companies 
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- Low returns to MNC strategies 
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- Search for market dominance 
- High internationalization 
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Quadrant 2. Learning MNC’s 
 
- Search for rapid growth 
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Quadrant 4. Global MNC’s 
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matching of those resources with opportunities. Strategic variables are constituted by 
options of entry, flexibility, exit and integration. Current resource availability, such as 
manpower, money, market access etc. etc. determines which variables can be chosen 
(Ahokangas, 1998). Timing is in other words essential and investments must happen 
at the right time and be of the right size in order to exploit anticipated future 
developments.   
 
In conclusion resource based models are used to analyze the behavior of companies 
and in some cases their development over time. In the resource-based models, much 
attention has been paid to the learning, resources, and activities of the firm as 
important elements in determining opportunities for rent (Ahokangas, 1998).  
 
3.6. Eclectic perspective 
Eclectic theory grew out of John Dunning’s work in the 1970s to respond to the 
growing role of international production and the emergence of the multinational 
companies (MNC) in the world economy. The word eclectic means using ideas and 
beliefs from different sources (Merriam-Webster, 2007). The theory, or paradigm as it 
came to be known since the 1980s, was developed from multiple streams of economic 
theory. It emerged from a shift in the economic theory from focusing on location 
factors towards incorporation of factors associated with ownership and organization 
of economic activity (Tolentino, 2001). Eclectic theory has been widely used to study 
which factors determine the location and the growth of FDI. Dunning (1973) used the 
theory to examine the level and pattern of foreign value-added economic activities in 
companies and countries. The range of variables used to explain the choices made by 
the company is broad and takes into consideration aspects of the company as well as 
its environment. The theory is by many considered to be more applicable to a macro 
economical level but its richness in explaining the motivation of a company for 
undertaking different actions makes it appropriate for analysis on a company level 
(Dunning, 2001). The lack of a holistic model identifying and evaluating the 
significance of the factors influencing both the initial act of foreign production and the 
growth of such production led Dunning to favor an eclectic approach (Tolentino, 
2001). This led to a framework being established, allowing other complementary and 
alternative theories and models to exist alongside the eclectic framework. The central 
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thesis is that the factors Ownership, Location and Internalization interact to decide 
productivity and sustainable competitive advantages.  
 
A: Ownership advantages: The investing company must have an ownership 
advantage over competing companies in the host10 country of FDI. These advantages 
are resources and assets that are capable of generating a future income stream 
(Tolentino, 2001) and can be both tangible and intangible. These advantages represent 
significant returns to scale, as the cost of transferring them for use is low. The 
ownership advantages represent the main asset of a company, because they represent 
the market or cost advantage of a company. It is important to develop and protect 
these advantages as competitors will try to copy them. Examples of ownership 
resources are natural resources, capital, manpower, technology, organizational and 
entrepreneurial skills, knowledge and access to markets.  
 
The fact that all business includes some transaction costs leads to the conclusion that 
an internationalizing company must have Ownership advantages. The assumption 
rests on the fact that a company will experience larger transaction costs when going 
abroad in a new market. Competing with local companies with smaller transaction 
costs, the ownership advantage compensates for the costs the internationalizing 
company has relative to local producers. These costs are costs of setting up and 
operating a foreign business (Ahokangas, 1998).  
 
B: Location advantages: The host country of the FDI must possess some kind of 
location advantages that favor FDI; otherwise the company would focus their 
resources (Ownership advantage) in their home market. The Location advantage is not 
transferable to other locations and is in other words immobile (Dunning, 2001).  
Dunning divided Location specific advantages into three groups:  
 
1. Access to and relative cost of production factors that can only be 
exploited by a company in a certain area: 
Firms often benefit from their localization. Access to resources when operating in the 
right place strengthens a company’s abilities to develop its resources. Input factor cost 
                                                 
10 Host country in this context means the country to which the internationalizing company extends its 
business.  
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such as the cost of labour has been one of the main motivators for labour intensive 
industry to relocate from Norway to cheaper labour markets in Eastern Europe. That 
labour is not easily relocated, and it would generally be more cost-efficient to move 
production instead of moving the labour, although that has also been done. Another 
example: In the early days of refining oil, refineries were located close to the drill 
head. The refineries were inefficient and a quarter of oil ended up as waste in the 
process. In order to keep the cost of crude to a minimum (saving transport) the 
refineries lay close to the wellheads. Today waste is around 4% and it is more cost-
efficient to refine oil in large refineries receiving oil from several different fields 
around the world (Browning, 2006).   
 
2. Taxes and trade barriers: 
These variables are created by governments and might be changed. Many companies 
consider these variables such as incentive programs, tax rates, tariffs, investment 
climate, political climate and import control before they enter a market. FDI is a main 
driver for economic development of a country, and the debate on this subject has 
become very complex11.  
 
3. Transportation costs and market access: 
In many industries, such as the food industry, where quantity is high and margins are 
low, distance and transportation costs are important, and the company will seek to 
establish itself close to the market. In more knowledge intensive industries producing 
high technology or immaterial products closeness to the market is less relevant. In 
some cases it may also be desired to locate within a certain country in order to gain 
market access on background of absolute and non-tariff trade barriers. For instance in 
Russia it is desired that the larger part of deliveries to the petroleum sector come from 
Russian companies (Murmanshelf, 2007).  
 
                                                 
11 Many governments, especially in emerging markets are eager to attract FDI and consequently adapt 
its regulatory regime to facilitate new entries. Some critics have argued that large MNEs have 
substantial bargaining power and may use this to take a higher share of the value added than is 
desirable to achieve economic development in the country (Minde, 2000).  
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Examples of location advantages are low-cost input factors, high quality human 
capital, a large market, clusters, good quality infrastructure, favorable government 
policies, favorable business culture, low psychic distance.  
 
C: Internalization: It must be more profitable for the company to internalize the 
Ownership and Location advantages in their own operations rather than using arms-
length arrangements (such as leasing, licensing, franchising, and joint venture). If it is 
not more profitable for the company to make transactions based on Ownership and 
Location advantages internal, they might as well sell, license, lease etc. their 
Ownership advantage to another party. Internalization strategies are followed up to 
the point  
 
Principal-Agent theory:  
A reason why it could be more profitable to internalize the Ownership and Location 
advantages is that it is impossible to write controllable and enforceable contracts with 
a foreign partner truly reflecting the worth of the advantage being marketed (Norman, 
2001). It is difficult to align a partner’s (agent) interests with those of the mother 
company (principal). This is what is known as the principal-agent theory. In order to 
prevent a partner from using its superior host market knowledge to act 
opportunistically on the mother company’s expense, the mother company internalizes 
its advantages. 
 
Transaction cost theory:  
The transaction cost theory was developed by Ronald Coase in 1932. He claimed that 
when a company tries to determine whether to buy or produce the goods itself, market 
prices are not the sole factor to consider. There are also significant transaction costs: 
search costs, contracting costs and coordination costs. Those costs often determine 
whether a company uses internal or external products and services (Watkins, 2007).  
 
Even though the internationalizing company faces additional costs compared to its 
host country competitors such as discrimination towards foreign companies, language 
and cultural barriers etc. it could more profitable to do the work themselves. The 
reasons for this are that a multinational company can transfer information and services 
internally more effectively than by communicating with a market. Buckley & Casson 
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(1976) see the multinational company as an “international intelligence system for the 
acquisition and the collation of basic knowledge relevant to R&D, and for the 
exploitation of commercially applicable knowledge generated by R&D” (p 35).  
 
Buckley & Casson (1976) focused especially on the existence of market 
imperfections, which generate benefits of internalization. Here, a distinction was 
made among five elements; 1: The absence of futures markets for knowledge 
production, requiring both the planning of knowledge development and its 
exploitation by the firm. 2: The inability of external markets to allow optimal price 
discrimination when selling proprietary knowledge. 3: The frequent occurrence of 
bilateral bargaining problems between monopolistic suppliers and monopsonist 
buyers of knowledge. 4: Buyer uncertainty, when purchasing new knowledge. 5: 
Various difficulties associated with pricing knowledge. 
 
Supporting this view, Norman (2001) says that internalization is often preferred when 
the advantages of the company are knowledge-based and when reputational effects are 
strong. Knowledge is as we see above more difficult to transfer across organizations. 
As for reputational effects it is more difficult to build a reputation merely being a 
supplier of a business concept or technology rather than being present in the host 
country.  
 
Rugman & Verbeke (2002) extend Buckley & Casson’s (1976) work to the 
information society’s reality. They argue that unlike Buckley & Casson’s idea of a 
one-way information flow, information between mother and subsidiary must flow 
both ways. Even though information exchange is internalized, even within the 
company the flow of information comes at a relatively high cost. They also find that 
the reasons for decentralization are not always grounded in formal strategic decisions.  
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3.7. Weaknesses of the internationalization theories 
In practice, internationalization behavior does not necessarily follow the models of 
internationalization presented by researchers (Strandskov 1986). This groundbreaking 
observation is further underpinned: “Firms use different operations or activities 
simultaneously irrespective of what is suggested by more or less theoretical models of 
the behavior of firms (Strandskov 1986).  
 
According to the internationalization literature, the process itself should be seen as 
divided. First there should be a theoretical approach from the internationalization 
theory, then a structure which integrates both the internationalization and a company’s 
management research in the chosen area (Ibrahim, 2001). The practice is somewhat 
different. The process leading to internationalization may not follow the recipe of the 
internationalization literature, but can be comprised of bits and pieces drawn from 
different theoretical approaches (Buckley, 1997).  
3.8. Arguments for our choice of theoretical approach 
We have chosen to use Dunning’s eclectic theory as an overall framework to analyze 
Reinertsen’s internationalization process. The case Reinertsen differs from much of 
the textbook examples given in the internationalization theory in the way that the 
company almost overnight went from no involvement in the Russian market to 
establishing a WOS. Reinertsen did not go through many phases ending up as 
committed to the Russian market, but committed itself through FDI right away, and 
Dunning’s eclectic theory is widely used to study FDI (Ahokangas, 1998) 
. 
 In line with Buckley (1997) we see value in not sticking to one theoretical approach 
alone. Consequently the Network and Resource Based approaches mentioned in this 
chapter will also be applied more briefly to the case within the eclectic framework. 
The eclectic decision models are, as will appear from the name, based on several 
different streams of theory shedding light to different aspects of the 
internationalization process.  
 
The reality facing a business in the internationalization process is complex, and 
therefore we argue that Dunning’s perspective, taking different views into 
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consideration is a suitable framework for analyzing success factors in a business 
establishment. Furthermore, eclectic models have been formulated and used as a 
theory of FDI, something which is appropriate for our case study.  The distinction 
between internal and external factors affecting FDI in Dunning’s theories makes it an 
excellent tool for systemizing and analyzing our empirical findings. Furthermore the 
internalization theory suggesting that in some cases internalizing facilities and 
resources is a better strategy than using arms-length agreements is very appropriate 
for analyzing why maintaining close control is vital in Russia.  
3.8.1. A summary of the eclectic theory:  
Dunning shows which advantages must be present for different strategies of entry into 
a market by drawing on different theoretical strings within competitive advantages of 
a business (Ownership), within localization of a business (Location) and within a 
business’ ability to internalize transactions to reduce risk and cost (Internalization).  
 
The theories’ application is shown in the following table. Only in the case that a 
company can show ownership, internalization and location advantages will it choose 
FDI as an entry strategy.  
 
Type of advantage present  
Ownership Internalization Location 
Contracts Yes No  No 
Exports Yes  Yes No 
Entry  
strategies 
FDI Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 3 Dunning’s Eclectic Theory and entry strategies (Dunning, 1993)  
 
In addition to the factors mentioned above (Read, 2007) claims that the company must 
also meet the following conditions in order to establish themselves abroad:  
• Sufficient financial resources to establish and maintain international activities.  
• Sufficient managerial resources to organize and coordinate international 
activities.  
• Sufficient strategic vision and motivation to internationalize (corporate culture 
and attitude towards risk).  
FRAME OF REFERENCE - INTERNATIONALIZATION 
                                                                
50 
 
These conditions may be argued to be Ownership advantages according to Dunning’s 
theory, but nevertheless we choose to list them here to clarify that specific financial 
resources and internationalization competences is advantageous to the 
internationalizing company.  
3.9. Our research model 
In order to arrive at a conclusion or at least extract the vital information from our 
empirical findings we need to develop a research model. The model below shows how 
we have combined and linked data and theory to each other to answer our research 
question. The methodological concerns cover all parts of our research and 
consequently all parts of this thesis.  
 
Reinertsen AS is the mother company. Reinertsen NWR is the daughter. These are 
both owners of internal advantages (Ownership). There is no clear division between 
Reinertsen AS and Reinertsen NWR and we have treated them as a single case. 
Reinertsen AS took the decision to internationalize and set up Reinertsen NWR, but 
the process did not end once the production plant was operative. It is still ongoing and 
the two companies overlap each other as they continue to build the business.  
 
Some aspects of the internationalization process such as strategy and motivation can 
best be understood by going to the source, Reinertsen AS. Other aspects of the 
internationalization process, such as their competitive advantage towards other locals 
and how they manage internal cultural issues can be better understood going to the 
daughter, Reinertsen NWR. The model shows which theories can be applied to shed 
light on the internal and internalization factors that affected the internationalization 
process of Reinertsen AS / Reinertsen NWR. Reinertsen’s organization, its network 
and its resources played a great role which we will look into. The transaction cost 
theory and principal-agent will explain why they wanted to go the mile themselves.  
 
Russia and North-West Russia is the general context in which the internationalization 
takes place. We have gathered data on Russian culture and business manner as well as 
the current situation regarding the petroleum industry. We will use theory on 
emerging markets and cultural differences to show how they affected the 
internationalization process and the way Reinertsen NWR operates.   
FRAME OF REFERENCE - INTERNATIONALIZATION 
                                                                
51 
 
 
Lastly we will recapitulate and highlight the most important findings from the 
analysis. The summary will be the very essence of the thesis as we have broken down 
the data, synthesized it via the theory and arrived at the core of the research.  
 
This model is graphically illustrated below:  
 
 
Figure 1: Our research model based on Dunning's eclectic theory 
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Summary 
In this chapter we have discussed the theoretical framework for the 
internationalization process. We have learnt that there is no consensus regarding the 
forces that drive internationalization. We have presented 4 perspectives, each with a 
different view on the factors that influence and drive a company’s internationalization 
process. Where one perspective is concerned with learning and innovation driving the 
process, another is preoccupied with the resource base as a basis of 
internationalization decisions. A third perspective sees the network as the main 
motivator, while the fourth perspective, our basis of analysis, draws on different 
theoretical streams to form an eclectic perspective.  
Theory is often different from practice. That is also the case concerning 
internationalization processes. The eclectic theory distinguishes between ownership 
and location advantages and internalization aspects. As a tool to separate internal and 
external factors and to look into the internalization of these, this eclectic perspective 
on internationalization forms a solid basis of analysis.  
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Background  
 
4. Russia 
This chapter gives a short introduction to Russia. We have tried to explain the 
difference from the western countries by giving a short summary of historical events. 
Further a brief introduction to cultural and business aspects are given.  
 
 
 
Quiet, quiet. Beyond the polar circle 
There sleep without separating their arms 
Next to a faithful friend, an inseparable friend, 
A dead friend a dead friend. 
—Vyacheslav Ivanov 
 
4.1. History  
The first assembled Russia rose in the 9th century when Scandinavian people united 
the spread villages and cities in the eastern part of Europe. The “Rhos” or Rus12 built 
up Kiev to become one of the greatest cities in Europe. The Kievian Rus ruled the 
country until the Mongols by Batu Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan, took control 
over all major cities in the 13th century. The Russian people were forced to send 
regular tribute to the Tatar State. In the next century nothing special happened. 
Because of the tributes, the Russian lived in poverty. In the 14th century Moscow 
became an important city. The Moscow challenged the Mongols and succeeded them 
in 1480. After a century with Ivan the Terrible and others as domineers, Michael 
Romanov was elected tsar in 1613. The Romanovs ruled Russia for three decades, 
with Peter the Great13 and Katharine the Great as the most important emperors 
concerning the modernization of the Empire. The Russian stood against Napoleon in 
the 19th century a victory which gave Russia status as a leading power. By now the 
                                                 
12 It is said that the word Russia came from the word Rus, which were Scandinavian people settling in 
Russia (Strand, 2005). 
13 Peter the Great was known for his “westernization” and crazy partying. He obtained his knowledge 
from western society when travelling around Europe. When visiting London he and a friend from the 
Netherlands borrowed a palace from the Dutch’s friends. When the owners came back they were 
shocked. Axes were stuck in the walls and the yard had big trenches. The combination of pepper-vodka 
and war play had ruined the palace (Strand, 2005). 
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Russian empire stretched from the Siberian in the east to St. Petersburg in the west. 
But as the Romanovs ruled the country a growing dissatisfaction grew among the 
people. In 1905, when the “weak” Nicholas II14 ruled, the soviets forced him to accept 
reforms.  
 
After 12 years of internal war and political turbulence, the Winter Palace was stormed 
by a group of sovieters in October 1917. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, which led the riot, 
could finally emerge victorious in 1920 after three more years of civil war. The 
beginning of the Soviet Era was a matter of fact. After Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin 
became the new Soviet leader. At the end of the 1930s this paranoid leader launched 
the Great Purges in which millions of people thought to pose a threat to the regime, 
were killed or exiled to remote Gulag camps. Stalin also forced a rapid 
industrialization of the rural country and collectivization of its agriculture. The Soviet 
Union was indeed rapidly industrialized, but the collectivization of the agriculture led 
to famines where hundreds of thousands starved to death. After a devastating WWII15, 
and heroic achievements by the Russian people, Russia emerged considerably 
stronger than before the war. The Soviet Union was at its start as a superpower.  
 
After Stalin’s death in 1953 Nikita Khrushchev took the leadership. With Khrushchev 
political controls were to some degree relaxed, and cultural life experienced a brief 
period of revival. But in 1964 he was ousted and Leonid Brezhnev gradually became 
the new leader. The country entered a decade-long period of stagnation, its rigid 
economy slowly deteriorating and its political climate becoming increasingly 
pessimistic. 
                                                 
14 He was seen as weak by the people. The word on the street said that his wife was “the man” in the 
marriage and that she beat him from time to time (Strand, 2005). 
15 The number of fallen Russian soldiers and civilians is estimated to 20 millions (Strand, 2005).  
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4.2. 1985-1991 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev 
“…a great deal is still to be done before stability develops into national accord” 
- Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev 
 
After three years of rule by Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB, and Konstantin 
Chernenko, the last leader of the Soviet Union took his seat in 1985. Mikhail 
Gorbachev saw the need for a structural change in the Soviet Union. He saw that the 
economic performance was lacking behind the rest of the world. In short, he saw the 
inefficiency of a wasteful system failing to utilize the Soviet Unions abundant 
resources to achieve economic growth. He described the Soviet Union in his book 
Perestroika, as a machine with loose transmission belts (Gorbachev, 1987). To lead 
the state back on track he launched a new platform which was founded on glasnost 
(openness) and perestroika (restructuring). He wanted to loosen up on social control 
opening some room for new ideas, relax control of the economy and generally allow 
for a little fresh air. This openness was certainly something new, but he would soon 
learn that changing this system inherited from Stalin would prove difficult.  
 
Restructuring began in earnest, with a vigorous housecleaning of the bureaucracy and 
a significant investigation into corruption. For the first time since Lenin private 
businesses were allowed and private shops, manufacturers and restaurants became 
part of the Soviet scene. In addition to improve the Soviet economy Gorbachev saw it 
as an important task to reverse the alienation of the people towards the socialist state. 
He wanted the people to become interested in and feel a responsibility for its 
development (Gorbachev, 1987). The censorship of the press was loosened, thousands 
of political prisoners were freed and the social sciences were allowed to explore and 
publish on many subjects previously off limits. 
  
What Gorbachev did not foresee was the enormous upheaval that would come partly 
as a result of his perestroika. Gorbachev never had any plans to abolish Communism. 
He wanted to preserve it with a more human dimension. Once he had opened 
Pandora’s Box of reform however, there was no turning back. The wind of change, 
made immortal by the German band The Scorpions, swept across the Soviet Union 
and its neighbors, changing forever the lives of millions and millions.  
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4.3. 1991-1999 Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin 
Our giant nation balances on a knife’s edge. And no one knows what will come to 
pass with it tomorrow.  
-Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin 
    
At the very end of Gorbachev’s rule, the Russian ship was in a dismay condition. The 
Norwegian journalist Steinfeld (1991) describes in his eye-witness report from the fall 
of 1991: Business is of a speculative and crude kind, buying cheap in the West and 
selling expensively at home. Or the opposite, creating little value. Little goods are 
produced domestically and 5 million tons of grain must be imported each month due 
to failing crops or no incentives to harvest crops. Inflation eats up people’s wages. 
  
Boris Yeltsin came to power in a popular revolution. In June 1991 he became the first 
Russian president to be elected democratically. Bayer (2007) says that Yeltsin gave 
Russia its first breath of freedom, but not true democracy. Yeltsin was himself a 
creation of the Soviet system, claiming that he genuinely believed in the party 
principles when joining the party at the age of 30 (Yeltsin, 2000). His party 
background put him in a position to seize power, but also haunted him: Yeltsin did not 
fully realize that Russia could not be liberalized or democratized as long as the 
Soviet-era bureaucrats remained entrenched in position. He would soon feel that on 
his body.   
 
Yeltsin was immensely popular in the beginning of his reign. Before he took office he 
had even warded off a coup d’etat against Gorbachev almost single handedly. He was 
seen as a man of action. When he surprisingly left office on New Year’s Eve of 1999 
appointing Putin as his successor, his popularity rating had sunken to two percent 
(CNN, 2002). The reasons for this are many. His clear cut will to make a difference16 
gave the common Russian hope, but disappointed her as his economic Shock 
Therapy17 and subsequent inability to manage the Russian economy sent millions of 
                                                 
16 Being raised in a peasant hut he knew very well the misery that befell much of the Soviet Union. On 
a trip to USA he visited a super market. He was shocked after seeing the abundance of meat and 
vegetables available to an ordinary American. After seeing this he was silent for hours, before he 
uttered the words: “What have they done to our people.” (Berger, 2007) 
17THE SHOCK THERAPY MODEL got its name from Poland's stabilization and liberalization 
program, initiated on January 1, 1990. The fundamental basis of the shock therapy model was the need 
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people into poverty. The sudden liberalization and privatization that were part of 
Shock Therapy enabled government connected opportunists to seize assets at a 
bargain price. This gave rise to the commonly detested and super-rich Oligarchs given 
an international face by Chelsea owner and mega-yacht enthusiast Roman 
Abramovich. Russia started on its way from egalitarianism towards today’s society 
with a vast gap between the rich and the poor. This was not all Yeltsin’s fault; much 
of what happened was inherited from Gorbachev’s perestroika (Bayer, 2007). People 
in position were of course reluctant to give up their advantages. Many adapted 
smoothly to the new reality, stealing whatever they could on the way from 
communism to one of the world’s most capitalistic systems.  
 
Boris Yeltsin was a disputed leader. Undoubtedly he had taken on a backbreaking task 
even for a young politician of excellent health. He however had a heart condition, 
suffered from periodical depressions and was an alcoholic with a bleeding ulcer. He 
had to start from scratch leaning on the only experienced people around, former 
members of a party he had just destroyed to rebuild Russia (Berger, 2007). 
Throughout his presidency he fought the Russian parliament, the Duma. In 1993 he 
even used military force letting tanks fire on the parliament, The White House, to 
ward off a coup attempt from rebellious parliament members.  
 
What had started out so optimistically had gone sour. At the time of Yeltsin’s 
departure from politics Russia was in a state of moral decay. A bloody war in 
Chechnya raged. Semi-criminals and criminals ran the Russian economy. Many 
people were worse off than during communism and a lacking legislative structure 
provided little basis to build a democracy. Yeltsin recognized that he in many aspects 
had failed (Berger, 2007). In his resignation speech he told the Russian people: “I ask 
forgiveness for not justifying some hopes of those people who believed that at one 
stroke, in one spurt, we could leap from the grey, stagnant totalitarian past into the 
light, rich, civilized future.” 
                                                                                                                                            
to establish economic, institutional, political, and ideological structures before any attempt to liberalize. 
Without this minimum foundation, radical reforms would have inhibited the transition to a competitive 
market capitalist system. (Schlack 1996:617). 
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4.4. Inside Putin’s Russia 
“Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.  
Whoever wants it back has no brains.”  
-Vladimir Putin 
 
Putin’s witticism on sentimentality versus reality clearly has s point. Russia has 
indeed undergone a transformation under Vladimir Putin. For many the future became 
rich and light. And civilization can, as found Peter the Great18, always be bought. 
Now, doubt remains as to whether driving a Bentley makes you more civilized, but 
many Russians seem to think so. The streets of Moscow are flooded with luxury cars. 
International luxury brands consider the city one of their most important markets and 
a rapidly growing middle class19 takes part in the most outstanding that western 
civilization has to offer: Shopping.  
4.4.1. 2000-2008 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin 
Putin was elected President of the Russian Federation on March 26, 2000. He was 48 
years old. His career started in 1975 as a KGB-officer in Leningrad (now St. 
Petersburg), where the law graduate stayed until he was sent to Dresden in 1985. In 
1992 he left KGB to pursue a career as a bureaucrat and politician in St. Petersburg.  
In 1996 he came to Moscow to climb the Kremlin career ladder at remarkable pace, 
ultimately ending at the very top (Reitschuster, 2004).  
4.4.2. Power structures 
The Siloviki 
The term “siloviki” is often used to describe today’s top level bureaucrats and 
decision makers. Petrov (2005) defines “siloviki” (power men) as officers of military 
and law enforcement agencies. Renz (2006) says that today the term indicates a more 
precise definition, describing politicians with a force-structure background20 coming 
                                                 
18 When Peter the Great built St. Petersburg he commissioned the best of Italian and French architects 
to create a piece of European civilization in Russia.  
19 This group has grown from 8 million in 2000 to 55 million in 2006 (Bush, 2006).  
20 The distinction between police, military and security forces is not clear cut in Russia. 10 different 
forces use uniform and have police authority. These are: The Ministry of Defence, the Interior Ministry 
(MVD), the Ministry for Emergency Situations (MChS), the Justice Ministry (Federal Prison Service—
FSIN), the Federal 
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to power under Putin. The “siloviki” is much more visible in the top government 
structures today than during Communism, and many attribute this to Putin, a former 
KGB officer, being a “silovik” himself. This is interpreted as a sign of a more 
authoritarian state under Putin, and the fact that the very power structures headed by 
the “siloviki” are perceived as highly corrupt by the Russian public (Galeotti, 2006) 
adds further to the negative connotations of the term. Renz (2006) does not agree that 
Putin is deliberately pursuing a more authoritarian state. She attributes the increased 
number of “siloviki” in government and upper bureaucratic levels to the fact that 
Putin appointed people he knew and trusted. She warns against catch-all phrases to 
analyze Russian politics.  
The Regional Administrations 
”Foreign investors should carefully consider the business  
practices in their specific region”  
- Ernst &Young 
 
Russia currently consists of 88”federal subjects” which are divided into Oblasts, 
Republics, Krais, or Autonomous Okrugs. The regional legislation and enforcement 
practices may differ between the different federal subjects. Ernst and Young further 
states that companies doing business in Russia should be aware that the regional 
administrations have substantial influence on the way business is conducted in the 
regions; both through local legislation and their formal and informal influence over 
agents responsible for enforcement of federal legislation. 
 
Knowing politics and politicians is in other words important when doing business in 
Russia. During Yeltsin’s era, the governors got a great deal of power and often 
interfered in business as well as politics. Being a foreign businessman in Russia 
without knowing the governor, could prove an impossible task. Some regions were 
worse than others, but still most governors were known as “small kings” in their 
republics, oblast or Okrugs (Hønneland at. al, 2006). One example is the governor of 
Kalmykia which had a “representation apartment” in Moscow. A journalist got access 
                                                                                                                                            
Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Anti-Drugs Service (FSN), 
the Federal Guards Service (FSO), the Federal Courier Service (GFS), and the Agency for Special 
Programmes under the President (GUSP) (Renz, 2006).  
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to this palace. The most impressive “scene” or floors was the one with a glass floor 
which made it possible to look down on the lower level where there was a big pool 
with flowers and naked ladies swimming as decoration for the governor (Hønneland 
& Jørgensen, 2006).    
 
Soon after Putin became president, he recentralized much of the power which the 
governors gained during the 90’s. Today the governors are more or less nominated by 
the president himself (Hønneland & Jørgensen, 2006). Whether this has made it more 
or less important to have your foreign business in Russia blessed by the governor, is 
an open question. Turovsky (2007) says that the governor’s ability to receive funding 
or preferential treatment from the Kremlin has not been increased under the new 
system, the importance of maintaining Kremlin loyalty has however been 
strengthened. A region’s wealth increases its central lobbying ability, something 
which might make the Murmansk governor more powerful as interest in the area’s 
petroleum resources grows.  
Organized crime and corruption  
The presence of organized crime in Russia is a major challenge for the authorities. A 
culture of corruption, dating hundreds of years back21 was only strengthened during 
the Soviet time. Since a legitimate market did not exist favors and goods were traded 
on a black market. The butcher gave meat to the tailor in return of pants. Those who 
worked in the service sector did not have any goods to trade, but would accept money 
in exchange of services. For instance an overworked medical doctor would not treat 
patients unless they paid him under the table. Or a policeman would pocket a bribe 
instead of writing a fine (Meier, 2003; Galeotti, 2006). This enabled them to take part 
in the black market.  
 
This culture of “entrepreneurship” has survived the Soviet era. During the 1990s the 
situation was exceptionally severe, as military officers used military facilities and 
equipment exempt from police controls, to store and distribute contraband as a service 
to criminal groupings. As their skills grew they became integrated criminal groups 
                                                 
21 Corruption in Russia is not a new invention. Already in early the days of the Romanov Empire were 
public servicemen encouraged to take bribes. A serviceman such as a tax collector in the district would 
get no pay check from the authorities. He was however entitled to receive gifts from his subordinates 
(Meier, 2003).  
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themselves, running among others drug operations from Afghanistan to Moscow. 
Many police officers moonlighted as body guards, drivers and doormen, and provided 
a shelter or roof, “krysha”, for criminal activities (Galeotti, 2006). On a higher level, 
Galeotti (2006) notes that the police’s own internal affairs division investigating 
corrupt police have often simply become the “krysha’s krysha”, blackmailing corrupt 
police instead of prosecuting them.  
 
Under Putin the situation appears less dramatic. The criminal elements have become 
more discrete. The gang wars from the 1990’s are past. The streets are safer for 
innocent bystanders, but the Russian Mafiya and its ties to the police and the military 
are very much present (Galeotti, 2006). President Putin has himself admitted that “the 
law enforcement bodies, unfortunately, are still afflicted with corruption and 
inefficiency, from the lowest level to the highest where we are talking about [bribes 
of] hundreds, tens of, thousands, perhaps millions of dollars”(Myers, 2005). In an 
interview with the New York Times a building contractor says he pays 5-10% of 
contract value in bribes. Otherwise he does not get any contracts. He adds: “It used to 
be called bribery. Now it’s just called business” Myers (2005). In Russia today 
bribery touches just about every aspect of life. The authors have themselves several 
times been stopped by police in Moscow, fishing for bribes over purportedly invalid 
immigration documents. A Muscovite we know opened up a beauty parlor late in 
2006. She wanted to move a sprinkler pipe that hung low in the middle of a room’s 
working space. The fire deputy would only approve moving the pipe to the wall, if he 
was bribed $ 1200, many times his monthly salary.   
 
The Russian NGO Indem Foundation monitors corruption in Russia. In a survey of 
1000 business people and 3000 civilians they found that bribery had multiplied 
tenfold from 2001 to 2005, reaching a volume of US$ 316 billion22. Health, fire and 
safety inspectors, tax police and law enforcement agencies were the most egregious 
bribe-takers (Ostrovsky, 2005). Transparency International has monitored corruption 
world wide since 1995. They rank Russia on a 127th place of 163 countries on their 
2006 Corruptions Perceptions Index with a score of 2.523. This places Russia as 
                                                 
22 That is 2.5 times the annual budget revenues. 
23 The CPI index relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and 
country analysts. The index ranges from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).  
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slightly cleaner than Rwanda, but as more corrupt than Honduras (Transparency 
International, 2006).  
 
The reasons for corruption’s growth under Putin are several. One issue is the salary of 
soldiers, policemen and other public servants. The average Russian earns $330 a 
month (Bush, 2006). Many public servants earn less than that and despite subsidized 
utilities, telephone and public transportation it is hard to get by on so little. Putin has 
not made room in the national budget to increase these group’s salaries (Galeotti, 
2006). Furthermore Putin’s crackdowns on corruption give the impression that he 
values loyalty more than honesty24. He maintains good working relations with many 
of the most corrupt figures in Russia and those who have fallen to corruption 
investigations have tended to be associated with his political rivals. To a considerable 
extent corruption allegations have become part of the toolkit to demote, displace and 
promote in order to create the police and military structures that is wanted (Petrov, 
2005).  
4.4.3. Freedom of speech 
As the Soviet era ended and Gorbachev’s Glasnost flowered, control over the media 
faded. The period from 1990-1992 was a golden age for Russian media. It was a time 
of privatization (often by occupation) of media facilities, proliferation of media 
outlets and a change in attitude and norm towards contemporary Western journalism 
(Zassoursky, 2005). At the same time media continued to be state financed, and 
suffered from no economic pressure (Krasnoboka, 2007). After that short period the 
economic downturn and political turmoil after the failed coup against Yeltsin 
presented the media with more meager conditions. The president consolidated power 
into his office and the oligarchs gradually seized control over the media turning most 
of the media houses into mouthpieces for different political groupings. The oligarchs 
gradually narrowed editorial freedom and many television shows changed into 
political slandering campaigns (Jack, 2004). As Putin seized power from the oligarchs 
the media was gradually monopolized again.  
 
                                                 
24 Andrew Jack (2004) emphasizes how much Putin values loyalty. He gives a crown example of 
Putin’s own loyalty, choosing to go down together with the overthrown Mayor of St. Petersburg 
Anatoliy Sobchak. Putin also is known to reward those who have been loyal to him, like ex KGB men 
and former St. Petersburg associates.  
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Today the national media is once again largely government controlled (Krasnoboka, 
2007). The two largest TV channels, Pervii Kanal and Rossiya are both state owned. 
The third on the list, NTV is owned by Gazprom. The state-owned gas giant has its 
own media arm, controlling several national newspapers, a publishing house, TV and 
radio stations with a total turnover of around $600 million (Ballin, 2006). The deal for 
Gazprom to buy popular large-circulation newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda in early 
2007 was seen as yet another move to strengthen state control over important media 
before the upcoming elections (Ballin, 2006). Another sign of prepping media for the 
elections was the RUR 2,7 billion ($100 million) allocated to the state bulletin 
Rossijskaya Gazeta in April this year. A proposal from a member of parliament to 
give 3 billion rubles in subsidies to print media in general, was cleverly manipulated 
to favor the state information bulletin now turned into a propaganda publication 
(BBC, 2007). 
 
But reward isn’t the only policy followed to fight negative coverage. Fifty to sixty 
attacks on journalists were carried out last year and 11 have been killed over the last 5 
years, making Russia one of the most dangerous countries to be a journalist in. The 
US based Committee to Protect Journalists recently published a report on the Russian 
media. It ranked Russia as the country with the third worst conditions for a free press. 
A new law that defines extremism as “the public slander towards figures fulfilling 
state duties” was one of the reasons for this bottom placement. (Krainova, 2007).  
 
On the bright side, journalists in regional newspapers have shown that there is still 
reason for hope for the free press. Moscow Times wrote on November 21, 2006 that 
the editorial staff of regional newspapers Berdsky Kuryer and Gorod KHM had 
walked out after their owners tried to remove articles about local corruption and abuse 
of power. The journalists then formed their own independent newspaper (Eismont & 
Hewitt, 2006).  
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4.4.4. Mentality: An unsettled past 
 
And fate made everybody equal 
Outside the limits of the law 
Son of a kulak or Red commander 
Son of a priest or commissar . . . 
Here classes were all equalized, 
All men were brothers, camp mates all, 
Branded as traitors every one . . . 
-Alexander Tvardovsky 
 
Applebaum (2003) writes in her book on the Soviet era Gulag system25 that a 
challenge in Russia today is the lack of confrontation with the past. She attributes it to 
the fact that too many of those who committed crimes and misdeeds during the Soviet 
era still are at large today. When the Cold War ended there was no systematic shift in 
the power elite of Russia. Many of those in position today hold their power as a result 
of connections and positions they gained during Communism. It is not in their interest 
to confront the past.  
 
As a result Russia is a country with large painful holes in its history. For instance one 
shall not stay long in Russia before meeting someone who can tell a relative’s story 
from communist suppression. In school text books however the topic is curiously 
absent. It is always painful to confront the past, but a cleansing process, a catharsis, is 
needed when circumstances change so dramatically. Instead of reflecting thoroughly 
on the past, Russia jumped on the very next train. The reluctance to confront the past 
will very likely have consequences for the forming of a Russian citizenry. The 
national suppression of history shows itself in a short-sighted mentality and also in 
                                                 
 
25 Gulag was the Soviet Union’s prison camp system. It is estimated that throughout the XX years it 
was operative, more than 20 million prisoners passed through it and that millions died in or as a result 
of a stay in the GULAG system. Common criminals, juvenile delinquent, political prisoners and war 
prisoners could end up together in this massive system of oppression. Many of them never found out 
why they were arrested before they died (Applebaum, 2003).   
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more extreme outcomes such as the growing racism26 and nationalism27 in a country 
with little tradition for criticism, not to speak of self-criticism.  
4.4.5. Russian Foreign Policy 
Understanding Russia has never been easy from a western perspective. We may still 
see references to Winston Churchill’s witticism about Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a 
mystery inside an enigma” and to Fyodor Tyutchev’s classical poetry: “With the mind 
alone Russia cannot be understood. No ordinary yardstick spans her greatness. She 
stands alone, unique, in Russia one can only believe”.  
 
As Russia in a short time span, has gone from an indebted nation with a chaotic 
almost anarchic structure to a wealthy energy superpower naturally her ambitions as a 
global actor have grown. Energy plays a pivotal part in Russia’s foreign policy, 
something that became clear when Russia assumed the presidency of the G8, putting 
Russia back into the loop by wielding the energy weapon (Yergin, 2005).  
4.4.6. Important rules and regulations 
Laws of Importance 
The Foreign Direct Investment Law which was adopted in 1999 is one of the most 
important laws for a foreign company. The law gives certain guarantees to foreign 
companies. For example it guarantees that Russian regulations shall not create a legal 
climate regarding investment activities and use of profits that is less favorable for 
foreign investors than for Russian investors (Bagautdinov, 2007). 
 
The law concerning Product Sharing Agreements (PSA) was adopted in 1995. Where 
PSA’s are established to develop recourses, 70 % of the supplies in the project should 
come from local companies. The PSA participants shall also maximize the use of 
Russian workforce. This means that qualified Russian companies should be given 
priority. The PSA legislation has important consequences for foreign companies 
                                                 
26 According to Russian police figures, crime against foreigners have risen 84% from 2000-2005 
(Zubchenko, 2006). Several judicial cases have shown juries acquitting defendants of committing 
murder on racial grounds. Thus the Russian Federation Public Chamber has proposed that juries be 
barred from cases involving charges of ethnic hatred (Kozlova, 2006). 
27 The Russian Orthodox Church adopted in May 2006 a Declaration on Human Rights and Dignity. 
The document declares that values like faith, morality, sacred things and the Fatherland are no less 
important than human rights. The declaration also decried efforts by foreign human rights organizations 
(Samarina, 2006).  
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which seek to become suppliers to Russian Oil and gas industry. Given requirement 
on local content, the companies will be better off if established in Russia. Companies 
registered in Russia and with at least 50% Russian-owned capital and are considered 
to be “local”. Company factors which the region yields from will all be in favor for 
the valuation of the company as a “local” (Fadeev, 2007; Andvik, 2007; Ernst & 
Young, 2006). 
 
Taxes 
The new Russian Tax Code came into effect on January 1, 2005 and the old Tax 
System Law has become fully phased out. The Russian tax, which is listed and 
regulated by the Russian Tax Code, includes several federal taxes and levies, regional 
taxes and local taxes (Ernst & Young, 2006). Compared with other economies, Russia 
still has too many taxes, which are often collected at short intervals. The authorities 
tend to modify the rules according to the budget situation. So far, all attempts to 
streamline tax laws and types of taxes have failed. The instability of the tax system is 
a deterrent to both foreign investors and development of business in Russia. 
 
Banking 
The Banking sector has been at the centre of attention in Russia the latest years. In the 
crisis of 1998, the whole banking system nearly collapsed. In 2004 the Russian 
Central Bank and Russian Government launched a major reform initiative that could 
fundamentally change the Russian banking sector and its structure over the next years. 
By monitoring the banking system and induce stricter control, the banking system will 
grow more stable (World Bank, 2004).  
 
Dnb Nor is the only Norwegian bank established in Murmansk. Since 1999 it has been 
located there through a representation office. In 2005 Dnb bought the Murmansk 
based bank Monchebank. “With the purchase of Monchebank, we position ourselves 
in an area which will face an exiting future when the oil and gas development in the 
region starts” said director Svein Aaser in Dnb Nor (Fadnes, 2005).  
 
Property Rights 
Security of property is still one of the most urgent problems the Russian economy is 
struggling with according to the World Bank (2004). There are many examples of 
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mafia-like business methods and corrupt decision makers operating in the 
“protection” business. For small firms this might pose a problem, as transaction costs 
rise, either through fighting the extortionists or through paying them off (Gonzales-
Vega, 2006). The authors have heard multiple insider accounts from foreign business 
men trying to establish themselves in Russia. Unfortunately very few are willing to 
come forth, as it will diminish their chances of continuing business should their 
criticisms be made public.  
 
One example came from a mid-level manager in an international tire producer. When 
they set up production outside Moscow it did not last long before a group of Russian 
business men demanded a share of their income. The situation became difficult after a 
while, and the tire-producer decided to withdraw from Russia. As they prepared to 
pack and transport their equipment, several armed men showed up and demanded the 
keys to the facilities. The tire-producer had to surrender its entire production line in 
the hands of these bandits. Clearly, in the cases this happens to a small firm, it is 
devastating.  
 
On a higher level, the Russian state is in the middle of a campaign to reclaim 
strategically defined assets, disguised as an effort to save the environment. Foreign 
and privately owned Russian companies have seen attractive mineral and petroleum 
extraction rights vanish before their eyes (Moscow Times, 2007, Economist, 2007, 
Ballin, 2006). From a Russian nationalistic perspective this makes perfect sense, but it 
is thought to be damaging to the performance of the petroleum and minerals sectors 
(Economist, 2007). 
 
If we look to prior experiences, Yeltsin’s loans for shares program privatized property 
rights in a prompt, but unfair manner. Kay (2007) compares in an article in Financial 
Times the now bankrupt, but once booming Argentinean economy with Russia today. 
He claims that the top-down allocation of property rights leads to a polarization 
between the rich and favored and those who are poor and see no other hope than 
trying to upset the property rights allocation. That is a dangerous sign for the future.  
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Customs/ Tariffs 
The average tariff in Russia has increased between 2001 and 2003 from about 11.5% 
to between 13% and 14.5%. This places Russia’s tariffs at a level slightly higher than 
other middle-income countries and considerably higher than the OECD countries. The 
food sector and light industry are the aggregate sectors with the highest tariff rates—
both have tariff rates in excess of twenty percent on a trade-weighted basis. At the two 
digit level, motor vehicles, footwear, leather products and sugar are among the most 
highly protected (Tarr et al., 2005). 
 
Like most countries in a position to do so, Russia to a large degree uses import duty to 
create a protectionist barrier for domestic production. It also uses import duty and 
regular import bans as foreign policy tools. This was the case when wine, mineral 
water, fruit and vegetables from Georgia was banned. The stated reason was quality 
concerns, but the scarcely hidden message is for Georgia to stay in line with Russia 
and seize aspirations towards becoming a NATO-member (The Spectator, 2006). 
Similar occurrences have happened to imports of Norwegian salmon, Polish meat and 
Belarusian dairy products in efforts from Russia pressure these countries.  
 
The Russian customs system is, like any other regulatory regime in Russia, extremely 
bureaucratic. It puts great demands on exporters to Russia to fill out documentation 
correctly and adhere to strict regulations. Grande (2007) says that Norwegian 
companies need training in dealing with the Russian customs system.  
 
Registration of Business in Russia 
 
“The entire registration process is rather time consuming.”  
-Ernst & Young 
The registration process for a company doing business in Russia is a complex 
operation. The registration authority takes care of state registration and registration for 
tax purposes, a process which involves several documents for the company to 
produce. The time for registration takes normally three to five weeks, but can take 
longer time in certain circumstances. If a document is considered unsatisfactory, then 
the document needs to be re-filed, a situation which stops the whole process (Ernst & 
Young, 2006). 
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4.4.7. The Russian Economy 
In the final years of the Soviet Union, the economy was so dysfunctional that 
continuing in its current condition was impossible. The five year plans which were set 
out by the Gosplan28 had focused more on production quotas than creating value and 
meeting demand. The system led to chronic shortages of supply and drove down 
quality throughout the Soviet economy (Houlleberghs & Zaslavsky, 2004). 
 
After failed attempts by Gorbachev to restructure the economy, Yeltsin had a well 
conceived strategy for how to reform when he came into power in 1991. “The young 
advisors” such as Yegor Gaidar, Anatoliy Chubais and Viktor Chernomyrdin started 
of by liberalizing prices and privatizing parts of the economy. But without any private 
economic experience from the Soviet times, there were few norms to guide 
commercial transactions and such. The economy during the 1990’s is best described 
as a “roller coaster economy”29, until it found itself in a devastating financial crisis in 
1998. With a mounting debt burden the economy went into a situation where 
devaluation and default ended the hopes for Russia for a quick transition to a 
functioning capitalist system (Houlleberghs & Zaslavsky, 2004).  
 
The Russian economy, since the 1998 crisis, has been impressive. The devaluation 
that followed as a result of the crisis, and the import restrictions and restructuring of 
the cash flow situation made national industry get somewhat back on their feet again. 
Industrial production growth grew from 5.2% in 1998 to 11% in 1999. The inflation 
was stable and the rise in consumer prices slowed (Høiby, 2004). Between 1998 and 
2005, the Russian GDP expanded by 48%, while real income of the population grew 
by 46% (World Bank, 2006). Last year, 2006, was the eight year in a row with 
growth, landing at 6.7% up from 2005. In addition to the high energy prices and the 
cheap ruble, the rise in foreign direct investment also played an important role (CIA 
Factbook, 2007). Today poverty has declined and the middle class has grown (World 
Bank, 2006). Important reforms in areas such as removal of administrative barriers, 
taxation and budgetary institutions have been important factors.  
 
                                                 
28 Gosplan was the all-powerful state economic planning agency (Houlleberghs & Zaslavsky, 2005). 
29 The economic figures such as GDP went up and down from year to year. There was no stability.  
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The huge governmental profits gained from the increased energy prices have mainly 
been used to pay of foreign debt. This has improved the economic situation for the 
state budget. A great part of the payment inflows from petroleum has also been put 
into a “Stabilization Fund”. This has contributed to keep inflation at relatively 
moderate levels. In January 2005, Standard and Poor's joined Fitch and Moody's in 
awarding Russia an investment grade rating (World Bank, 2007).  
4.4.8. FDI in Russia 
”To fully realize its investment potential, given its natural resources, large domestic 
market and relatively low wages, Russia needs to cut the restrictions facing foreign 
investors looking to invest in Russian firms”  
-OECD, 2006  
 
The OECD Investment Policy Review of Russia from 2006 is a survey of Russia’s 
approach to international investment agreements. It concludes that despite the growth 
of FDI, Russia needs more international investments to support the country’s 
economic development and diversification. Since 2003 investment has reached 
historical levels in 2005 and 2006.  
 
The rising flow of investment into Russia is an important vote of confidence in the 
country’s outlook (Moore, 2006), but still the FDI level is low compared to other 
countries (OECD, 2006). In 2005 it accounted for less than 3% of GDP while in 
Poland it was nearly 5%. Of the total of FDI in Russia today, much of it is said to 
come from Russian-owned offshore assets being reinvested in the country. In 2005 
28% of the FDI came from Cyprus30. And even tough other sectors such as 
manufacturing has benefited from rising inflows, still much of the total has inevitably 
been directed towards the oil and gas industry (Moore, 2006).  
 
Further the OECD report concludes that insufficient policy transparency remains a 
serious obstacle to investment. Administrative bureaucracy and transparency in areas 
such as land and property registration and work permits limit opportunities and 
encourage corruption. Also the forthcoming laws on “strategic sectors” and on subsoil 
                                                 
30 Cyprus is an attractive offshore zone. It has been widely used by the Russian oligarchs and other 
newly rich people in Russia to hide money taken abroad during the 90’s and later (Lowtax.net, 2007).  
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will be a test of the government’s commitment to transparency, concludes OECD 
(2006). The Review recommends that the future strategic sector law narrowly defines 
the sectors concerned, limits the scope of restrictions to foreign control over domestic 
companies based on a strict interpretation of essential security interests.  
4.4.9. The Economy in Murmansk Oblast 
Murmansk oblast is one of the regional districts where the government will increase 
their efforts. The region is full of hope, especially when it comes to oil and gas in the 
future. Today we also see a growth in both domestic and foreign investment in the 
city of Murmansk, and the expectations are high for the North Westernmost region in 
the country. Some even expect the region to have the same average income and 
standard of living as in Norway in a few years, if the Shtokman development comes 
(Haukanes, 2007). But let us not forget that Murmansk has other industries as well, 
such as fisheries, mining and forestry. In addition to the resource based industry there 
is also mechanical yards and factories, engineering companies and service and 
supplier industry connected with the sectors (Høiby, 2004). In the future the tourism 
industry is also expected to gain a boost (Barentsobserver, 2007). 
 
A heritage from Soviet times, the economy in region is still very dependant on the 
larger “town-forming” companies (Høiby, 2004). These are big companies which run 
most of the industry such as for example fishery. These companies are to a large 
extent self sufficient. They have their own supplier chain which supplies the main 
company with the needed products and services. For other domestic or foreign 
companies it may be difficult to sell or serve these companies if they do not offer new 
technology, concepts or equipment that will raise the efficiency of their activities 
(Høiby, 2004).  
 
There are several features which differ between the major cities such as St. Petersburg 
and Moscow to the more isolated regions such as Murmansk. The Consumer market is 
one example. Even tough the inhabitants of the northern regions have had a raise in 
their consumption the latest years; they are still far away from reaching the level in 
the major cities. The average salary for a worker in Murmansk was about RUR 6000 
pr. month in 2004. In St. Petersburg it was RUR 9000 and in Moscow it was RUR 
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12000. Still, it has to be taken into consideration that housing and other goods and 
services are generally lower priced than in the major cities in Russia (Høiby, 2004). 
4.4.10. FDI in the Murmansk region 
New laws on Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and Concessions can have a positive 
impact on helping the regions attract more foreign investment. Regions may exploit 
their potential comparative advantages better if they are implemented in a non-
discriminatory and transparent manner, with a minimum of market distortion (OECD, 
2006). If Russia should be able to attract higher levels of FDI, also regions outside 
Leningrad and Moscow have to become more attractive for FDI (Kuboniwa, 2000). 
 
The Murmansk Region has a middle position among Russian regions when it comes 
to investment priorities. It has a rank of 3B1, which says that it has lowered potential 
but not high risk. The regional government continuously works with strategies with 
aims of increasing the efficiency and competitive ability of the economy. In 2005, 
investments were estimated to RUR 17,48 billion. Norwegian investment was fourth 
highest after countries such as Belize, Virgin Island and Cyprus (Barentsnova, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
The Russian history is different from “the western” in many ways. Russia has been 
under Asian control and took a communistic turn in the beginning of the 20th century. 
As Russia opened its economy and pursued a democratic path in the beginning of the 
90’s they experienced a dramatic and unstable decade with economical crises and 
privatization. As Putin became the leader in the year 2000, he started to nationalize 
much of the lost state properties. One of his main targets was a growth in the GDP 
and stable inflation. Even though he has succeeded in gaining much of the lost 
property back and an economical growth, the country is still criticized for lack of 
democracy and openness in the press. They also still face corruption and an unstable 
business climate. But progression is made, and Russia is today gaining both WTO 
membership and higher investment rankings.  
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Figure 7: World marketed Energy Use by Energy Type  
(IEA, 2006) 
5. The Petroleum Industry 
In this chapter we highlight the global energy situation and the focus on the new 
energy region, the High North. We also give a short brief in the Norwegian and the 
Russian petroleum sectors and the energy cooperation between the countries. 
 
5.1. Geopolitics 
”World energy consumption is projected to increase by 71 percent from 2003 to 
2030. Fossil fuels continue to supply much of the energy used worldwide,  
and oil remains the dominant energy source.”  
-IEA, 2006 
5.1.1. The increasing demand for energy 
The global economy has become more global than ever. Non-OECD countries such as 
China and India have experienced an exploding economic growth (IMF, 2007). 
Because of the coherence between economic growth and energy consumption, the 
world is facing a historical growth in the energy demand. A major part of the growth 
comes from non-OECD countries (IEA, 2006), a growth that will continue over the 
next decades.  
International Energy 
Agency predicts an increase 
in world energy 
consumption of 2 % a year 
until 2030, with a total of 
71 % from 2003 to 2030. 
Fossil fuels will continue to 
supply much of the energy 
used worldwide, and oil 
will remain the dominant 
energy source. 
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Figure 8: Yearly average oil price (IEA, 2007) 
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Figure  10: World oil price in 3 cases up to 2030 
(IEA, 2006) 
The consumption of oil is expected to rise from 84 million barrels per day in 200531 to 
118 barrels a day in 2030. Natural gas and coal is expected to have an even more 
increasing consumption. They will become more popular among energy consumers, 
much due to the limitation of oil supplies. Renewables and nuclear energy are 
expected to increase in production, but the output will not be large enough to reduce 
the dependency on fossil energy sources (IEA, 2006). 
5.1.2. The Oil price 
As the demand for energy increases 
more than the production, prices take 
an upward turn. In 1994 the price of 
one barrel32 of oil was US $15,53 33. 
Today it is at US $62,99 34. IEA says 
that in the future the oil price may 
stay at reference, which will be at $ 
50-60. Or - it may fall to 35-40 
dollar. Or – it might become even 
higher reaching $ 65-100. Finally, IEA predicts that we are more likely to see a price 
above the reference than lower.  
 
With high energy prices, less 
profitable fields become more 
interesting. Regions and fields 
which were seen as to costly to 
explore and develop attract 
investment. New technology and 
increased experience with complex 
fields make this possible. 
 
                                                 
31 Of which the US consumed 20,8 million barrels (25% of total) a day. The US motor Gasoline 
consumption alone was 9,16 million barrels (EIA, 2007),  3 times the production in Norway (2,97 
million barrels in 2005) (BP, 2006).  
32 1 barrel = 42 gallons or 159 litre 
33 The price is for one OPEC reference basket (ORB) 
34 4th of May 2007 
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5.1.3. Energy Security 
“Safety and certainty in oil lie in diversity and diversity alone”  
– Winston Churchill 
 
To be able to meet high energy prices and also to prevent high prices, diversity in the 
type and origin of the energy is important. Kalicki and Goldwyn point out that energy 
at stable prices is a fundamental requirement for the stability and success of an 
economy (Kalicki & Goldwyn, 2005). Daniel Yergin stresses that diversifying the 
sources of supply lessens the impact of any particular disruption and provides 
opportunity for compensating supplies (Kalicki & Goldwyn, 2005). This is close to 
Churchill’s maxim: “Diversification of supply is one of the main guarantors for 
security and, indeed, is the starting point for energy security.”  
 
In 2003 OECD countries consumed over 55 percent of world energy production (IEA, 
2006). The oil consumption in the US made out 25 percent of the world’s 
consumption. Of the consumption 60 percent was imported. Also in the EU the import 
rates are high. In 2030 it is expected that 90 percent of the oil consumption have to be 
covered by import. The import of gas is estimated to be 80 percent of which 60 
percent will come from Russia (Euractiv, 2005). To be able to meet future energy 
requirements, regions such as the US and the EU has to look to new areas of supply. 
Large emerging economies such as China and India will be particularly dependent 
upon stable sources of supply as their economies evolve further.   
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Figure 10: The circum
polar area (O
G
21, 2006) 
5.2. The High North 
5.2.1. The Arctic 
The IEA and the US Geological Survey estimate that 25 percent of the worlds 
remaining worldwide undiscovered hydrocarbon recourses are located in the Arctic. 
The Arctic area covers the Circumpolar Area and can be divided into several smaller 
areas such as 
Northern Canada, 
the east coast of 
Greenland, the 
Barents Sea, the 
Sea of Okhotsk, 
the Kara Sea and 
onshore Russia. 
All areas will face 
severe challenges 
and the challenges 
are different 
between the 
regions (OG21, 
2006). The region 
contains two core 
areas for world oil 
and gas output, 
Alaska and Siberia. Russians, Americans and Canadians have developed petroleum 
there for 30 years. Apart from these areas, where operations have largely been 
pursued on land, the Arctic represents fairly virgin territory (Johnsen, 2006). 
5.2.2. The Barents Sea 
The resources located in the Barents Sea, which is both Norwegian and Russian 
territory, gain much attention today. At this point two Barents Sea fields are under 
development: the Snøhvit field in Norway and Prirazlomnoye field in Russia. Several 
other fields are planned in both Norway and Russia. Rough weather conditions and 
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the vivid marine environment make the Barents Sea a difficult place for petroleum 
developments (OG21, 2006).  
5.2.3. The “New Focus” 
In a speech in Tromsø November 10, 2005, The Norwegian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, stressed a new and preferred international focus for 
Norway: The High North. The northern arctic area is described as a region with huge 
possibilities concerning natural resources, tourism and fishery. Particularly the focus 
on energy gains international attention. To meet the future challenges due to increased 
interest in energy development, the Minister launched a project called Barents 2020. 
The project forms a start towards developing the High North, which is expected to be 
one of the most interesting regions in Europe, especially when it comes to energy 
resources and international cooperation (Støre, 2005). In the Strategy Plan for the 
High North, composed by the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs, it is stated 
that one of the main targets is to develop a closer cooperation in the High North, 
especially with Russia. Norway, which has long and well-established experience in 
the petroleum sector, will be an important actor in the Barents energy developments. 
Developing offshore fields has been a daily challenge for Norwegian companies and 
world class technology has been generated (Thirud & Tjelta, 2005).  
5.3. The Norwegian Petroleum Sector 
The production of oil in Norway started in 1971 at the Ekofisk field. With the help of 
foreign oil majors and governmental national companies, the petroleum sector has 
advanced to become Norway’s most important industry. It is vital to the national 
economy, and has made a big contribution to the development of the Norwegian 
welfare state. A substantial proportion of the revenues from the oil and gas sector 
accrues to the state, and contributes to the government’s solid financial position 
(OED, 2007). 
 
In 2005, Norway was the third biggest exporter and the 8th biggest producer of oil in 
the world. In gas it was the third biggest exporter and 7th biggest producer (OED, 
2007). This clearly shows the global role Norway has established as an energy 
supplier.   
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Figure 11: The Norwegian continental shelf (OED, 2007) 
 
 
5.3.1. The Norwegian Continental Shelf 
 
In the future the 
Norwegian oil production 
is expected to decrease. In 
2001 there was a peak in 
the production (OED, 
2007). Since then the 
production has declined 
as a result of lower 
production at the main 
fields in the Northern Sea.  
 
Even though production 
is declining it is still high 
compared to the 
discovery of new fields. 
The large production 
combined with the 
declining reserves results 
in a decreasing reserve 
basis for the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS) (OG21, 2006).  
                                                                                                                                                   
To change this situation it is important to focus on exploration of new fields. Moving 
the exploration of the NCS further north may solve the problem of declining reserves 
and production. In comparison to the North Sea, the Norwegian and Barents Seas are 
newer and holds more promise with regard to petroleum development (OG21, 2006). 
In the future considerable increased production is expected from these fields, while 
the production in the North Sea is expected to decline further. 
 
Operating further north presents new challenges. The Barents Sea with its harsh 
climate and vulnerability due to its many species and vivid wildlife will be 
particularly challenging (The Norwegian Government, 2006). To cope with not only 
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environmental issues but also ice conditions, darkness and long distances to the 
markets, new technology and strict project management is crucial (OG21, 2006).  
5.3.2. National Organization of the Petroleum Sector 
”Close contact between various Government agencies and the oil and gas industry 
is important for the successful development of activities on  
the Norwegian continental shelf”  
-NPD 
 
The framework for the Norwegian petroleum activities, such as opening of new areas 
for exploration activities, approval of major development projects or issues of 
principle, is formed by the Norwegian Parliament. Authority is also delegated to the 
Government and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. Thus, overall administrative 
responsibility for petroleum operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf rests 
within the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED, 2007).  
 
A close interaction between the authorities, oil companies, research institutions and 
universities is a key factor in the effort of value creation and competitive production 
of petroleum resources in Norway. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy works in 
close dialogue with the Norwegian-based oil and gas industry to strengthen 
competitiveness on the Norwegian continental shelf, as well as the competitiveness of 
the supplier industry (OED, 2007). 
 
In petroleum policies, government ownership is one of the most important used 
instruments. There are two major Norwegian oil companies controlled by the 
Government, Hydro and Statoil. Both are listed on the stock exchange and they are 
treated as any other independent, commercial company. There is a sharp distinction 
between the government as an owner and as regulator of the petroleum industry 
(NPD, 2007).  
 
Another important objective is to make the Norwegian oil and gas industry 
competitive on a global scale by making it able to take part in exploration and 
production activities in other petroleum provinces outside the NCS. There is a strong 
support for internationalization of the Norwegian oil and gas industry (NPD, 2007).  
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5.3.3. The Norwegian Petroleum Cluster 
According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), building the Norwegian 
expertise has also been an important part of the Norwegian petroleum policy. In 
addition to all the major international oil companies, the Norwegian oil and gas 
clusters consist of internationally competitive supply and service companies covering 
the entire value chain, from exploration via development, production and operation to 
decommissioning. Norwegian companies are among the leading in the world when it 
comes to seismic survey, drilling equipment, sub-sea facilities and floating production 
solutions.  
      
 
Appendix D illustrates which suppliers are needed in different phases of a field 
development. For instance, rent of the rigs is a dominating post in the exploration 
phase, while engineering services and fabrication of large constructions represent the 
main activity under the development of the field. When the field is in operation, 
administration, transport, service and maintenance become dominant. Of course, 
many actors work within several or even all these phases. In other words, petroleum 
activity gives origin to a considerable market (Intsok, 2007). The skills, experience 
and technology developed on the NCS are utilized by the international oil and gas 
industry all over the world. An example is the Norwegian-based sub-sea industry that 
has a leading position internationally with a 70-80 % share of the global market 
(Thirud & Tjelta, 2005).  
 
Investments by oil companies in development, operation and maintenance on the 
Norwegian continental shelf generate a considerable demand for products and 
services from the supply industry in Norway and abroad. Oil companies’ international 
activities give the Norwegian supply and service industry new opportunities. 
International experience and participation in international development projects are 
extremely important for the further development of the supply and service industry. 
This international experience could also help reduce the cost level on the Norwegian 
continental shelf. 
 
In 1997, Intsok was established on the initiative of the government. The idea was to 
create an organization that could support the Norwegian petroleum cluster 
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internationally. As a regional development of oil and gas was expected in Northern 
Norway, an area without any petroleum experience, PetroArctic was established in 
1997 as an organization for companies which want to position themselves as sub-
suppliers to the petroleum activities in the Barents Sea. With over three hundred 
members, whereof 240 have achieved contracts, the organization is described as a 
success. Today PetroArctic has established cooperation with its sister organizations in 
Murmansk and Archangelsk, Murmanshelf and Sozvedzye respectively.  
5.3.4. Norwegian Petroleum Technology 
The development of Norwegian and Norwegian based petroleum knowledge has been 
an important part of the Norwegian petroleum policy. In the early phases most of the 
technology was transferred from foreign companies and suppliers (OED, 2007). 
Today with more than 30 years experience, the Norwegian petroleum industry has 
world class companies, supply industry and research institutions. The industry has 
succeeded in developing unique products and technology to a demanding sector 
(Thirud & Tjelta, 2005). Especially offshore technology in harsh climate has given 
Norwegian suppliers a substantial advantage in the global competition (OG21, 2006). 
Experience gained through operating on rough Norwegian Seas and many foreign 
soils, has made the Snøhvit and Ormen Lange possible. These projects make a solid 
fundament today which may be further developed in the exploration of the Barents 
Sea and the Arctic Region.   
5.4. The Russian Petroleum Sector 
In October 1876, the first shipment of oil from Baku35 arrived in St. Petersburg. This 
was the start of the petroleum adventure in Russia. The first oil pioneer in the country 
was the Swede Ludwig “the Oil King of Baku” Nobel. After the revolution in 1905 
the foreign investors were chased out of the country (Yergin, 1992).  
 
Under the Soviet regime, the petroleum sector was, like the other industries, under 
national governmental control. It was then as now the locomotive in the Russian 
economy. Since the time of the Soviet Union, the national organization of the 
petroleum sector has changed. In Soviet times, oil and gas were clearly divided in a 
bureaucracy with many ministries and directorates. In 1989 the different ministries for 
                                                 
35 Baku is the capital and largest city in Azerbaijan.  
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oil and gas were merged to one: The Industry and Energy Ministry. The objective was 
to achieve a more uniform energy policy and let the production unions handle 
practical business. The different production units were divided into two governmental 
companies with economical independence. One for oil; Lukoil and one for gas; 
Gazprom (Hønneland & Jørgensen, 2006).  
 
The plan did not yield the expected results. In the 1990’s the oil and gas business 
underwent privatization programs, which resulted in a formation of vertically 
integrated energy holdings by a small group of oligarchs close to power 
(Houlleberghs & Zaslavsky, 2004). Yukos and Sibneft were two prime examples of 
companies achieved by oligarchs for a low price.  
 
When Putin came to power a new era began. The former wealthy and powerful owner 
of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was faced with trials and is today locked down in a 
tiny cell in Siberia. Yukos has been sold off in parts, with state owned Rosneft gaining 
most of the pieces through questionable auction processes. Rosneft-owner, Roman 
Abramovich, was a little cleverer and did not, unlike Khodorkovsky, interfere in 
Putin’s politics. As he had to sell of his company to Gazprom, he could collect a nice 
sum of money. Today he is the wealthiest man in Russia36 and number 11 in the world 
(Houlleberghs & Zaslavsky, 2004; Forbes, 2007; Midgley & Hutchins, 2004).  
 
As the energy prices increases the revenues from the oil and gas exports goes up. The 
state achieves increased state budgets, but becomes more dependent on the oil and gas 
exports. Today petroleum exports contribute with 20% of Russia’s GDP, 55% of the 
export revenue and about 40% of taxable income (Hønneland & Jørgensen, 2006). 
The energy sector has become the absolutely most important weapon of yielding 
pressure in both foreign and domestic relations. 
5.4.1. Energy strategy towards 2020 
In May 2003, the Russian government issued a strategy document which outlined the 
major priorities in the energy sector. With 30% of world gas reserves and 10% of 
world oil reserves, an important strategy for the future will be growth in the exports to 
boost the economy (Piper, 2007). To do so, an increase in production is necessary for 
                                                 
36 A ranking made by Forbes, where they estimate his net value of $18,2 billion.  
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which there is an urgent need for investments throughout the petroleum value chain 
(Houlleberghs & Zaslavsky, 2004).  
5.4.2. Petroleum Deposits 
Since the beginning of the oil adventure, Baku had been the field of interest. In the 
1930’s the “second Baku” was discovered and developed in the Volga-Ural area. The 
discoveries in Western Siberia followed in the 1960’s and became the most important 
fields of production at the end of the 1970’s. This “third Baku” in Khanty Mansi made 
the Russian petroleum adventure world class. Some of the found were gigantic and 
was cost-effective to produce. The fields in are still the most important in Russia, with 
a 70 percent of the total domestic production (Hønneland & Jørgensen, 2006).  
 
In the gas sector the real development did not start until the 1970’s and 1980’s in the 
Timan-Pechora area in the Komi republic. Gigantic discoveries were also made in the 
Jamal Nenets and the Barents Sea. The current production of gas in the Nadym Pur 
Taz area and in the Jamal Nenets amount to 90 percent of total domestic production.  
 
Figure 12: Map of the different petroleum fields in Russia (Brunstad, 2007) 
 
 
 1  T he  B a ren ts  S ea 6  T he  C as p ian  S ea
2  Y am a l P en ins u la  and  K a ra  S e a 7  E as te rn  S ibe r ia
3  W es tern  S ibe r ia 8  S ak ha lin  Is land
4  T im an  P ec ho ra 9  S ea  o f O kho ts k
5  C auc as us 10  C huko tka  a nd  B e r ing  S ea
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Most of the current Russian oil and gas production is still onshore. In addition to the 
fields in the Yamal Peninsula and Western Siberia, the Timan Pechora, the Caucasus 
and Eastern Siberia are all onshore. Even though the Russian petroleum industry has a 
long and great experience in production onshore, the lack of investment and foreign 
cooperation have contributed to several challenges. For example is the extraction 
degree37 in some fields as low as 20% and of what they get to the surface, 90% is 
water (Skretting, 2007). The precarious situation may create opportunities for western 
technology and services in the future: If the main targets of the Energy Strategy 
towards 2020 are to be met, new technology is needed.  
 
Russian Petroleum Investors (RPI) estimates that currently more than 40 oil and gas 
projects in various stages are being developed on Russia’s continental shelf (RPI, 
2006). Of the fields in the Russian Barents Sea the main focus has been on Shtokman, 
the big master field which “everyone” has heard about, but where nothing has 
happened yet. This gigantic gas field was discovered in 1988. It is located in the 
central part of the Barents Sea, about 600 km north-east of the city of Murmansk. 
Shtokman’s explored reserves are valued at 35300 billion cubic feet38 (bcf) of gas. 
This makes it one of the world’s largest proven offshore gas deposits (Gazprom, 
2007a). As of today the project is delayed from its original plans. Whether production 
will commence in 2012 or in 2035 the disagreement among “experts” is as wide as a 
Babushka’s behind. Following Alexey Miller’s statement that Gazprom will use 100% 
of the Shtokman field resources on its own (Gazprom, 2006a) the disagreement on the 
starting date has become even hotter. Intsok thinks actual work will start at earliest 
2010. And by that, they mean that the first phase of “Cutting Steal” will not begin 
until 2010. Intsok, which follows the project very closely, also state that Gazprom and 
its surroundings are working very actively with the project today (Skretting, 2007). 
The Norwegian environmental NGO Bellona estimates start at earliest 2035 (DN, 
2007b). Gazprom itself stresses that the project is of strategic significance and that 
they have delayed the project management and foreign partner attraction for the Phase 
1 concept until spring 2007 (Gazprom, 2007a). In other words, we just have to hold 
                                                 
37 The degree of how much oil one gets up from a reservoir. If a reservoir contains 100 million tons of 
oil, only 20 million tons gets to the surface, while 80 million remain in the ground. 
38 The total Norwegian gas consumption in 2005, counted 3000 billion cubic feet (bcf) (BP, 2006).  
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our horses and wait for the grand master Gazprom to decide where the road goes from 
there.  
 
At present time the Prirazlomnoye oil field, which is located south east in the Barents 
Sea, is under development. The license to explore and produce hydrocarbons in the 
field is owned by Sevmorneftegaz, a 100 % Gazprom owned subsidiary. The field was 
discovered in 1989 and contains 292 million barrels (mb) of oil (Gazprom, 2007b). In 
a meeting in February 2007, Gazprom’s core business units, Sevmorneftegaz, Gazflot, 
Sevmashpredpriyatiye and Morneftegazproekt stressed the importance of the 
Prirazlomnoye field project.  New infrastructure created inside the project area will 
form the basis for further hydrocarbon resource exploration in the Barents and Kara 
Seas. As of today, Norwegian companies (mainly from Southern Norway) have been 
awarded 30% of the offshore deliveries in this field (Barlindhaug, 2006). 
 
The Yamal Peninsula is another strategic gas resource for Gazprom (Terekhin, 2007), 
and one of the most promising gas-bearing regions in West Siberia. So far, 26 fields 
have been discovered in Yamal, containing 367000 bcf39 of proven reserves of gas 
and 1800 million barrels (mb) of extractable oil. The Yamal Peninsula is located east 
of Novaja Zemlja in the Yamal Nenets Okrug40. The peninsula covers huge oil and 
gas fields such as Kharasoveyskoe, Kruzenshternskoe and Bovanenkovskoe 
(Geopolitics of Energy, 2006). Gazprom, the operator of these fields, has planned the 
level of gas output up to 2010 to be provided both by the operating fields and by the 
new fields that are being put on production in the Nadym–Pur–Taz region in Yamal 
Nenets. Developing the fields in this region is economically viable because of their 
proximity to the existing gas transportation infrastructure (Gazprom, 2007a). In the 
period following 2010, the gas output targets are to be met by developing fields on the 
Yamal Peninsula, on the shelf of the Arctic seas, in the water areas of the Ob and Taz 
gulfs, in East Siberia.  
 
The Kara Sea also contains considerable resources. The huge offshore gas fields such 
as the Leningradskoe and the Rusanovskoe which are possessed by Gazprom, are seen 
as strategic reserves (Terekhin, 2007), and are not planned to be developed for the 
                                                 
39 This is 10,4 times Shtokman reserves. 
40 Okrug is the same as district or county (Hønneland &Jørgensen, 2006).  
BACKGROUND- PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
                                                                
86 
 
foreseen future. But it is worthwhile following the development of the plans for this 
area. 
 
The Caspian Sea is very rich when it comes to resources in both oil and gas. Even 
tough IEA concludes that it is difficult to estimate exact figures; the oil reserves vary 
from 1700 to 4900 mb and gas to 232000 bcf (EIA, 2007). When the Soviet Union 
was dissolved, the economies in the countries surrounding the Caspian Sea collapsed. 
As the economic and political situations stabilizes, so will the growth in the petroleum 
investment (Terekhin, 2007).  
 
The Sakhalin Island consists of five major projects, which in creative Soviet style are 
named Sakhalin 1-5. The most mentioned projects, Sakhalin 1 and 2, are expected 
completed in 2007, being fully operative by 2008 (The Sakhalin Times, 2007). 
Sakhalin 3-5, which are located in the Sea of Okhotsk, is explored and development is 
expected to come soon (Rosneft, 2007). In the Sea of Okhotsk, fields such as the ones 
in the West Kamchatka, and fields in the Chukotka and Bering Sea might see 
development in the foreseeable future (Rosneft, 2007). 
5.4.3. Important Oil and Gas companies in Russia 
With the privatization in the 90’s most of the oil companies went to oligarchs through 
the infamous “stock for loans” agreements41. Companies such as Lukoil, Sibneft and 
Yukos came in private hands. Gazprom and Rosneft kept the governmental ownership 
and are today the main state owned companies, seizing more and more of the 
“strategic” resources. Sometimes their portfolio expansion is on the expense of other 
Russian or foreign companies, such as the case of the Sakhalin project where Sakhalin 
Energy, Shell and Exxon were forced to give shares to Gazprom and Rosneft to dodge 
environmental accusations. 
 
Gazprom which accounts for 85,5% Russia’s total gas output and some 20% of 
worldwide natural gas output, is the undisputed dominator of Russian gas. Gazprom 
produced 19300 bcf of gas in 2005. The increased production in combination with 
                                                 
41 An arrangement where banks agreed to give loans to a starving government. The deal was simple: 
pay it back later or give us shares in your industry. The government solved the problem by “giving” 
away companies such as Yukos and Sibneft. The bankers soon become industry magnates, known as 
the oligarchs (Houlleberghs & Zaslavsky, 2005). 
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high prices resulted in incredible profits. In 2005 they achieved a net profit of RUR 
311.1 billion or US $11.6 billion, up from 209.4 billion rubles in 2004 (BBC, 2007; 
Gazprom, 2007). With more gas than any other gas company in the world, about 17% 
of the world’s proven gas reserves and more than 60% of Russia’s reserves, it has a 
dominating role not only in Russia but also in the global market (Terekhin, 2006).  
 
Gazprom is planning to increase its annual gas output to 19600 bcf by 2010; to 20650 
bcf by 2020; and to 21900 bcf by 2030. To do so, one objective is developing their 
resources in the North. As owner of fields such as Shtokman, Prirazlomnoye and 
several other fields in the Barents, Yamal Peninsula and Kara Sea, Gazprom will be 
one of the most important players on Russian territory and especially in the High 
North. As whole-owner of several other companies which operate in the North it 
might be an important “friend” for companies urging for operations in the North or 
other places in Russia. One of the 62 companies it fully owns is Sevmorneftegaz, 
which is the owner and operator of the Prirazlomnoye and Shtokman fields. Another 
company Gazprom fully owns is the exploration and ship-owning company, Gazflot, 
which operates in the North and several other places in Russia. In addition to the fully 
owned companies, Gazprom also owns, with more than 51 percent of the stocks, 44 
companies. Looking at ownership of less than 51 percent, they own stocks in 59 
companies. Adopting an aggressive international strategy consisting of cooperation 
with several major international companies, they are en route to their main target. As 
deputy chief executive, Alexander Medvedev, said during an interview in April 2007: 
"We'd like to be the most-valued and most-capitalized company in the world by 
reaching a $1 trillion market capitalization in a period of seven to 10 years" (Lucian & 
de Roy, 2007). 
 
Rosneft is also an interesting company when it comes to future growth. It was 
established in 1992 to manage the production that were not yet privatized and it would 
also play a role in the management of government stakes in privatized companies. The 
plan did not end up as expected and by 1998 Rosneft had lost much of its subsidiaries 
to private major such as Sibneft. In 1998 the situation changed. After gaining support 
from Putin, the quest for getting assets back has progressed (Houlleberghs & 
Zaslavsky, 2004). Today Rosneft aim to become the leading Russian energy 
company, both in production and financial performance. One of the strategies for 
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reaching the target is to increase crude oil production by exploiting existing crude oil 
reserves (Rosneft, 2007).  
Other companies that have shown considerable growth in both production and profits 
are Lukoil and TNK-BP. Lukoil controls 18 percent of the Russian oil production. 
The company is listed on the London Stock Exchange and has a wide cooperation in 
Russia with Conoco Phillips (Lukoil, 2006). TNK-BP is a joint venture between 
Russian TNK and British BP, a 50-50 relationship. They are the third biggest oil 
producer in Russia controlling 15% of the production (TNK-BP, 2007; Houlleberghs 
& Zaslavsky, 2004). Companies such as Surgutneftegas, Yuganskneftegas, Tatneft 
and Bashneft also have a substantial part of the oil production. The two former 
oligarch-owned companies, Yukos and Sibneft, are both sold off and are on the hands 
of mostly state-owned companies such as Gazprom and Rosneft. 
Of foreign companies operating in Russia, besides BP and Conoco Phillips, Shell has 
the largest operations. Last year however, Shell ran into problems in Russia 
concerning the product sharing agreements42 (PSA) made in the mid 90’s. 
ExxonMobile and Total have also faced similar problems in their PSA’s.  Italian ENI 
which has operated in Russia since the 1950’s has a joint venture with Stroitransgaz 
(ENI, 2007; Houlleberghs & Zaslavsky, 2004). In October Chevron and Gazpromneft 
signed a framework agreement establishing a joint venture for exploration and 
development activities focusing on the Yamal-Nenets region of western Siberia. 
Chevron will maintain a 49 percent joint-operated interest (Chevron, 2007). We see 
that even if the western majors still face problems in Russia, it does not stop them 
from continuing business in this resource rich country. 
5.4.4. Russian Supply Industry 
With a projected increase in investments in the petroleum market, the growth opens  
new opportunities for investment in the petroleum supply industry. For example has 
the American Schlumberger, one of the biggest petroleum field service companies in 
the world, experienced a major growth in its operations. Its Russian revenue has 
                                                 
42 Are used primarily to determine the share a private company will receive of the natural resources   
(usually oil) extracted from a particular country (Wikipedia, 2007). 
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grown from $50 million in 1999 to $1.25 billion in 2006, an annual increase of 50 
percent (RPI, 2007).    
 
The Russian energy analyzing agency RPI43 indicates that the Russian product supply 
market and the service market will be a booming market over the years to come, 
opening opportunities in almost all of its segments for various industry players. They 
size the Russian oilfield service market to amount to about $10 billion annually.  
 
This may create opportunities for both foreign exporters and investors. For foreign 
companies seeking markets in Russia, Intsok stresses that they will face many benefits 
by producing their products in Russia. It will be easier to pass Russian standards, the 
product can be tested in nearness of Russian customers, local installers get to know 
the products and it makes it easier to perform servicing of the product after 
installation. With Gazprom companies such as Sevmorneftegaz and Gazflot 
establishing themselves in Murmansk, now is a good timing for establishment there 
(Skretting, 2007).  
 
The experience from the Prirazlomnoye field shows that Norwegian companies 
specialized on offshore technology and maritime operations have opportunities to 
seize a considerable market share in upcoming offshore developments (Barlindhaug, 
2006). 
       
Appendix E shows a lack of companies with experience from offshore operations, 
especially within the area of sub-sea and decommissioning (Skretting, 2006). 
 
But even though there is a market for offshore experience in Russia and the timing is 
correct for production in North West Russia, Intsok stresses that the big decisions are 
taken in cities such as St. Petersburg and Moscow. If a company wants a contract, 
stresses Intsok, it should establish itself in the larger cities (Skretting, 2007). 
                                                 
43 RPI (Russian Petroleum Investor) is a leading publication service on the former Soviet Union oil and 
gas industry. 
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Figure 13: Decision makers in Prirazlomnoye development (INTSOK, 2007) 
 
This graphic shows the important actors of the Prirazlomnoye development. The 
management and decision makers of these companies are not situated Murmansk but 
in the technology capital St. Petersburg or the finance capital Moscow (Skretting, 
2007). 
5.5. The Russian-Norwegian Energy Cooperation 
To meet the increasing demand for the resources in the Arctic, a future strengthened 
cooperation between Norway and Russia is expected. In 2002 when Norwegian Prime 
Minister Bondevik and Russian President Putin declared a future Norwegian-Russian 
energy cooperation, Putin emphasized the importance of the energy dialogue between 
the countries (Enoksen, 2006).  
 
By entering into close cooperation with Russia, Norway may strengthen its position as 
a petroleum state. The two countries are both experienced in the petroleum sector and 
have the opportunity to learn from each other. It is therefore of importance that the 
Norwegian petroleum cluster are active in maintaining a strong position in the coming 
oil and gas bonanza in Russia as well as on Norwegian side. Today we see Statoil and 
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Figure 14: The Pomor Zone (Barents Observer, 
2007) 
Hydro working towards participation in the Shtokman field. Even though ownership 
participation was turned down by Gazprom last year (Gazprom, 2006a) hope has not 
yet vanished for a participation in some way or other. The Governor of Murmansk 
stresses that the Norwegian technology is necessary for developing the fields and the 
Norwegian companies should be included (Barentsobserver, 2007d). 
 
Statoil is playing a proactive role in that sense. Funding and advising Murmanshelf, a 
Murmansk based petroleum supplier union, analogical to PetroArctic in Northern-
Norway, the company plays an active role in educating the Russian supplier industry 
(Andvik, 2007). The goal is to develop international contacts, so that Russian 
businesses may learn from others and in turn from each other. Much competence is 
needed on issues such as HSE, logistics and quality control (Fadeev, 2007). 
Knowledge on issues like setting out strategies and working towards them, and on 
financing and managing projects is also needed (Andvik, 2007). Fadeev is the 
Director of Murmanshelf, while Andvik acts as its counselor from Statoil. Asked how 
a Norwegian company should go about to establish itself in Murmansk they 
emphasize knowledge of language and culture and long-term thinking as vital. They 
further state that cooperating with a Russian partner may be useful, especially in an 
initial phase to avoid judicial and regulative surprises.  
 
Statoil’s obligation and a memorandum of understanding with the local authorities 
also include other areas of commitment such as contributing to Murmansk 
Philharmonic Orchestra (Andvik, 2007).  
 
5.5.1 “The Pomor Zone” 
From the report Barents 2020 an 
establishment of an industrial and economic 
zone between Norway and Russia is 
suggested. The zone will stretch from the 
Petchenga fiord in Murmansk Oblast to the 
Jarfjord in Sør-Varanger Municipality. “The 
Pomor Zone” is meant to facilitate 
Norwegian-Russian cooperation in the 
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development of offshore hydrocarbon fields in the Barents Sea. The common zone is 
warmly welcomed by the Norwegian government and also by the government of 
Murmansk Oblast and the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov (NRK, 2007a).  
 
5.5.1. ”The Disputed Area” 
Norway and Russia have negotiated over the delineation of the 175,000 square 
kilometers disputed zone for more than 30 years, without reaching a compromise. In 
April 2007, after a meeting between the Norwegian and Russian foreign ministers, the 
Russian foreign minister expressed an unprecedented positive position on the zone in 
the Barents Sea. ”We have come a long way in the finding of a solution on the area 
located closest to the coast”, Sergey Lavrov confirmed. The statement indicates that 
the countries have agreed on how to divide the areas closest to shore. 
(Barentsobserver, 2007c). The area is expected to contain several major fields of both 
oil and gas.  
 
 
Summary 
The global energy market experience a high demand for energy recourses due to the 
globalization and economic development in non-OECD countries such as India and 
China. As the prices of energy stays high, new areas become interesting for 
development. 25% of the remaining hydrocarbon recourses are expected to be located 
in the Arctic. Great deals of these recourses are located in Norway and Russia. 
Especially Russia possesses gigantic fields such as the Shtokman. But their lack of 
offshore experience is a problem Norwegian company’s hope they may solve by 
participating in the Russian project. As talks of Shtokman and Gazprom is dominates 
the Western media, several other offshore fields and companies are of interest in the 
Russian market. Independent from whether the Shtokman decision will include 
Norwegian companies or not, the Russian-Norwegian energy cooperation is expected 
to strengthen in the future. 
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6. Reinertsen AS and Reinertsen NWR  
This chapter presents an overview of the internationalization process of Reinertsen 
AS, resulting in the establishment of the WOS Reinertsen NWR. The overview is 
built mainly on information from interviews with Torkild Reinertsen, President of 
Reinertsen AS and Svein Grande, Manager of its subsidiary Reinertsen NWR. 
 
 
 
”If you sleep with a bear - either to make love or to fight, 
 there is a great chance of being wounded.”  
 
-Torkild Reinertsen 
 
6.1. Reinertsen AS 
Reinertsen is a family-owned Trondheim based company. They offer EPCI 
(Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Installation) deliveries within the fields 
of construction and oil & gas. This paper has focused on the oil and gas side of 
Reinertsen’s activities.  
 
Reinertsen AS is one of the bigger Norwegian actors within EPCI deliveries to the oil 
& gas sector. The company operates in the entire value chain, delivering counseling, 
operational and maintenance services on addition to EPCI deliveries. The 2006 
turnover was NOK 2.2 billion and the company has around 1500 employees. 
Reinertsen has offices in Norway, Sweden and Russia (Reinertsen AS, 2007).  
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Figure 15: Corporate Structure Reinertsen AS (Reinertsen AS, 2007). 
 
6.2. Reinertsen NWR 
“Our establishment in Murmansk happened under special circumstances.” Torkild 
Reinertsen explains further: They had won a project for Fluor (a supplier to Statoil) 
and Statoil. The project was planned to be produced in Poland to reduce cost.  
 
“On the 10th of January 2005, a little more than two years ago, I was sitting right 
there.” He points to his desk. “Our prospects looked gloomy. The competition had 
established production in low cost countries, while we had all our production in 
Orkanger (in Norway). That was the moment when the idea first came to me. We 
were going to establish ourselves in Russia.”   
 
The background for this decision was Torkild Reinertsen’s travels to Russia the last 
15 years. He had been there a lot and had closely monitored the development in 
Russia. He had however not given serious consideration to the thought of entering the 
Russian market earlier. Now, with the competition establishing themselves in low cost 
production countries, Reinertsen too had to diversify their production opportunities. 
But Torkild Reinertsen wanted more than “being a small piece in a big Polish jigsaw 
puzzle”.  
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Deciding to move away from Poland in order to create their own sphere of interest in 
a more virginal market, Reinertsen AS had to move quickly in order to meet the time 
demands of the Fluor / Statoil project. “Production was scheduled to start on the 18th 
of April, and we knew absolutely nothing about where we were going to do it. We 
didn’t even know in which city we were going to establish ourselves. So we stormed 
ahead” says Torkild Reinertsen.  
 
Thus, in record time, a company was set up. Murmansk, with an ice-free harbor was 
chosen over Archangelsk as the city of production. Svein Grande was hired to be the 
operative manager of the plant, but it soon turned out that his Russian language skills 
were needed for other aspects of the operation as well. Therefore he soon took over as 
manager for the entire operations.  
 
Grande says that in order to speed up the process, an already existing sleeping 
company was bought. Existing production facilities were found and bought within the 
Murmansk Shipyard complex. The facilities severely needed upgrading, and in order 
to minimize bureaucratic hassle a local approved contractor was hired to do the 
upgrading.  
 
“Fluor was dead against doing the project in Russia,” says Torkild Reinertsen. “They 
said we had nothing there. No place to be, no network of suppliers and no 
infrastructure whatsoever. Statoil was more positive to the idea.”  
 
Since Statoil was interested in gaining a foothold in the North-Western Russian 
market, having them as a customer was an advantage to their establishment. Statoil 
went so far as to provide financial support to Reinertsen NWR for the training of 
Russian operators. In order for them to comply with strict production standards, they 
were all sent to Reinertsen’s Orkanger production facility for training. Here they were 
trained in HSE and became certified welders. Torkild Reinertsen says that they also 
got NOK 400.000 from Innovation Norway as well as support from Hydro.  
 
The first shipment was, despite dim prophecies, delivered on time and according to 
specifications. As of today Reinertsen NWR is already generating profits.  
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6.2.1. Company structure 
Reinertsen NWR is 100% owned by Reinertsen AS. Reinertsen NWR’s organization 
map can be found in appendix B. As of May 2007 it has 83 employees: 10 in the 
administration, 19 engineers, 2 electricians, 1 mechanic, 3 drivers and 48 welders and 
platers.  
 
Although being Norwegian-owned it is registered as a Russian company. In the initial 
phase a Russian partner owned a share of 30% in the venture.  
 
“We swore that we would avoid at any cost taking on a Russian partner!” Torkild 
Reinertsen explains that they were early pressured into taking on a partner. “The first 
time we went there to look for a production site, many locations were available. The 
second time we came, all of a sudden not a single location was free.” He says it was 
pretty apparent that local actors expected to receive a piece of the pie. “The problem 
is however, says he, that the local businessmen have no competence on supplying the 
international oil industry.”  
 
Eventually they had to take on a Russian minority partner in order to get a production 
site. The partner was explained plainly that the business venture would not yield the 
high returns he expected. Torkild Reinertsen says that he is very happy with a return 
around 7%, while the partner probably believed that 30% was realistic. He did not 
understand the high demands for quality and HSE that were required in the 
production. The aspect of internal invoicing could also prove problematic. Torkild 
Reinertsen tried to explain that internal invoices on products and services from the 
mother company would look quite steep in Russian eyes, and that perhaps the Russian 
partner would think he was being scammed. After a year where Torkild Reinertsen 
traveled intensively to Murmansk, the partner finally understood that Reinertsen 
NWR was not a note-printing press, relented and gave back his share of the company.  
 
According to Grande, the Russian partner did not provide much help in the 
establishing. He points out that Russian business men are very short-term minded, 
paying more attention to having a fancy car than a healthy business. There is a 
Norwegian saying, “Å spare seg til fant”, which could be used to describe this 
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mentality: The short-term mentality results in cutting costs to such an extent that it 
becomes an obstacle to create value. Grande says that it would have been an obstacle 
in the long run, having a Russian partner.  
6.2.2. The Product 
Reinertsen NWR prefabricates large structures in steel, for delivery to the petroleum 
industry. The structures make part of constructions that are later finished in Norway. 
A long-term goal is to engineer and manufacture complete sub-sea and platform 
modules in Murmansk, using Russian raw materials. Torkild Reinertsen estimates that 
the cost of producing in Russia is around 30 – 40% lower than in Norway.  
 
Appendix C shows all completed and ongoing projects that Reinertsen NWR has 
undertaken.  
6.2.3. Suppliers to Reinertsen NWR 
Reinertsen NWR is dependent upon competitive and competent suppliers. Reinertsen 
NWR must meet strict standards regarding quality and HSE routines. This also applies 
to all sub-suppliers. Supplies such as steel, paint and insulation must come from 
approved suppliers.  
 
Most Russian businesses are not capable of meeting the strict petroleum business 
standards and still be competitive on price. Henceforth the only commodities that can 
be bought locally today are machined and turned steel parts.  
 
Another obstacle to the use of Russian subcontractors is the business mentality. 
Grande says that a Norwegian company may be very happy with a 5 percent profit, 
whereas a Russian business would deem that margin too low. Grande thinks this 
mentality is especially characteristic when Russians deal with foreigners. He gives an 
example from the cement work at their new production plant. In the end Reinertsen 
NWR decided to do it themselves at a cost of NOK 2 million. The cheapest Russian 
bid was for twice that price.  
 
As a result of these factors, Reinertsen imports most of their supplies. Imported goods 
must, naturally, undergo strict custom controls. Grande says that the biggest challenge 
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for him, regarding customs, is training Norwegian suppliers to comply with custom 
standards. There is little competence on export to Russia in Norway, and not many 
businesses are approved exporters to Russia. In order to overcome this lack of 
competence on behalf of Norwegian sub-suppliers, and to overcome Russian customs 
bureaucracy, all procurements are centralized and shipped from Reinertsen’s main 
office in Trondheim.  
6.2.4. Competition 
As of today there are few or none Russian competitors for Reinertsen NWR. The 
products are so specialized and must meet such strict standards that Russian 
companies are not competitive. Other manufacturers of steel products in the area are 
cheaper than Reinertsen NWR, delivering similar but low-standard products. Grande 
says that many large ship yards in the area are capable of constructing complex and 
high-tech constructions such as submarines. They have however difficulties meeting 
specifications and time limits. There is also the issue of HSE and quality control that 
makes it challenging for international petroleum companies and suppliers to deal with 
these large and bureaucratic actors.  
6.2.5. Customers 
Reinertsen NWR does not deliver to any Russian companies as of today, but have 
been able to meet the high international and Norwegian standards as a deliverer of 
heavy steel structures to the Norwegian petroleum sector. The structures form part of 
more complicated structures assembled outside of Russia. As an example, the first 
contract Reinertsen NVR delivered was steel constructions for Statoil’s Kollsnes 
facility. Other customers include Norsk Hydro and FMC Technologies. The products 
are consequently exported from Russia to projects and customers abroad.  
6.2.6. The Public Framework 
Local authorities 
Grande says that Reinertsen NWR maintains a good relationship with the Murmansk 
authorities. The governor himself conducted the official opening of the company. He 
expressed gratitude that finally someone actually undertook a business venture in the 
area, instead of speaking of the enormous future possibilities the area offered.  
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Grande has experienced little trouble with Russian bureaucrats and public servants. 
He can not say for certain why that is so, but wittily suggests that the fact that you 
need a “propusk” (a permit) to enter the shipyard area might have a positive effect on 
the number of visits from public servants. Torkild Reinertsen sees the connection to 
the governor as crucial: “The public authorities have been supportive to our initiative. 
We have created jobs, and a positive attitude towards our operations is established”. 
He subscribes the lack of bureaucrats running down the door to the fact that the 
governor is very positive to what they are doing.  
Regulations 
Many rules and regulations from the Soviet days still endure. Grande mentions a few 
examples: For the new production hall that they are building they are installing 
electric power. In addition to providing cables and a transformer station from the main 
grid themselves, they have to pay a fee of about NOK 1500 per kilowatt installed 
capacity. With a capacity of 2 megawatts the connection fee is NOK 3 million. With a 
large capacity electric installation they are obliged to employ an electricity 
commission. This commission consists of 3 electricians, of which one must have a 
higher degree within the field of electricity.  
 
To keep cranes, they must have a crane commission of 5 men. The most striking 
example is perhaps the strict routines surrounding the company car. In order to keep a 
car, they must employ one mechanic, one nurse and one driver. Every day the 
mechanic is to check that the car is in a satisfactory condition, whereas the nurse 
makes sure that the driver is in a satisfactory condition. If that is so, they make a 
journal entry that everything is all right. The journal is checked and signed by the 
manager before the driver may use the car.  
 
Grande attributes cumbersome regulations to the fact that most Soviet-day companies 
were really large and suffered from no shortage of workers.  
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6.2.7. Corruption and organized crime: 
Torkild Reinertsen gives an example of an unpleasant happening, but underline that 
Reinertsen has zero-tolerance for corruption. He claims that there is a difference in 
mentality between people in NWR and Moscow-based people. The Moscow based 
people are greedier and unlike local entrepreneurs not interested in creating local 
value.  
6.2.8. Cultural aspects 
The role of the manager and the employee 
Svein Grande is a very versatile man. Apart from speaking and writing Russian, he 
has experience from being a metal worker, and industrial diver, a farmer and a truck 
driver. His practical experience comes in very useful, being a leader in Russia. Natalia 
Swahn (2002) has written a doctoral thesis on the cultural differences in business 
between Norway and Russia. Her findings on the role of the leader show clearly that 
there is a great difference between how a Russian and a Norwegian leader behave and 
is expected to behave. For instance, a Russian employee expects his leader to be more 
skilled than himself, even in the details of the work. The leader is expected to give 
detailed instruction on a finished product’s characteristics and even on how to proceed 
to end with satisfactory results. The employee then carries out the work strictly 
according to instructions. Swahn (2002) claims that even if the worker might 
understand that something should be done in a different way, he will not deviate from 
the instructions given to him by his superior.  
 
Grande says that he spends much more time in the shop than he had originally 
intended. His practical skills are very useful, giving him the ability to set a good 
example for his subordinates in their work. The term subordinate might seem harsh to 
Norwegian ears, but the hierarchy in a Russian business is very strict and the leader is 
supposed to know the answers to any problems that might arise. The leader must act 
decisively and show no doubt in order to not lose respect (Swahn, 2002). Grande 
mentions that the Norwegian leader of the development of their new plant faces some 
problems utilizing his Russian colleagues. He thinks this might have to do with the 
fact that the leader spends too little time outside of his office, in the field.  
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Grande has first hand experience being a leader in Russia. He says that his leadership 
style is Norwegian, adapted to Russian conditions. He is aware of the fact that he has 
to act authoritatively to maintain respect. He mentions a few examples of the 
challenges he faces. A contract of employment is very detailed. Russian employees 
are prone to be less flexible than their Norwegian counterparts. A welder for instance 
is reluctant to take on other tasks than welding. Grande says that it has been a 
challenge for him to make employees understand that he expects the employees to 
work with tasks other than their main task if that is needed. Initiative at the work place 
is something of a challenge for him. The writers think that this might have something 
to do with the work ethics adopted under the Soviet regime. A Soviet worker had no 
incentive to do more than a minimum. Unless he did something directly wrong, he 
would not lose his job. If he did something wrong he would lose his job or at least 
attract unwanted attention from his superiors. Therefore it was better to do a minimum 
than try to do a good job, since the payoff was the same.  
 
Grande further says that Russians are extremely problem-oriented. He is often met by 
an attitude that something can not be done. In that case, he pulls rank and says that 
they might be right, but they are certainly going to try to do it. And most of the times 
they succeed.  
 
Grande says that Russian workers have a great professional pride, and that they are 
professionally capable. Reinertsen NWR pays more than the competition, they invest 
more in their staff and also expect more back. That, thinks Grande, leads to proud 
staff, working for a high status company.  
 
Svein Grande writes and speaks fluent Russian. He says that knowing the language is 
an absolute requirement for doing business in Russia. The fact that he speaks Russian 
makes it possible for him to feel the pulse of the company. He says that it is 
impossible for someone who does not speak Russian to notice signs of conflict or 
discontent with something or another. In addition to Grande’s language competences, 
only two Russian employees speak a little English and a little Norwegian respectively. 
As a consequence Grande spends much of his time acting as an interpreter. For 
instance a Norwegian inspector from Veritas or an oil company that has comments on 
something, must go through Grande to communicate those comments. This keeps 
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Grande updated on the details of the operation, which is probably good for a Russian 
leader, but it is very time consuming.  
 
Cultural differences or demonstrations of power? 
Reinertsen NWR is willing to support local businesses with the right attitude in order 
to build a supplier base. Asked what “the right attitude” is, Torkild Reinertsen gives a 
few examples of the opposite. He describes meetings with fancy-title General 
Directors with no service attitude whatsoever and lack of knowledge on their own 
company. “It is expected that the customer comes bootlicking the supplier.” He tells 
that business transactions that would be a formality in Norway, like ordering concrete, 
becomes an entire ceremony where the customer is expected to almost beg the 
supplier to do business with them. 50% of the transaction must be paid in advance and 
there is unnecessary much paperwork with many different stamps on it.  
 
“The right attitude is someone who can appreciate the supplier role. Someone who 
can be humble” says Torkild Reinertsen.  
 
Torkild Reinertsen offers a down to earth point of view on culture: “If you have an 
attractive product and customers like doing business with you that is the most 
important.” Meeting with other cultures, he sometimes wonders what are results of 
cultural differences and what are pure power demonstrations? 
6.2.9. The road ahead for Reinertsen NWR 
There are many positive spin-off effects for the local community connected to 
Reinertsen NWR’s activities. “We have no desire to build up internal competence on 
the entire specter of services that we need” says Torkild Reinertsen.  He adds that they 
are constantly looking for local actors with the right attitude, to build a base of 
Russian suppliers.  
 
Reinertsen NWR has no clearly defined goal. “We continue the process of building 
our business”. Today’s bottleneck is in engineering capacity, but the construction 
capacity is also almost fully utilized. Reinertsen NWR is almost fully booked for the 
remainder of the year, even with 80 operators working there.  
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Reinertsen AS has also established an engineering office in Murmansk. 30 engineers 
are working via the intranet, participating on projects with engineers from 
Reinertsen’s locations in Norway. To achieve a good result from this decentralized 
way of working, Reinertsen AS has employed NASA inspired working methods. Each 
location where engineers work has interaction rooms with video-conferencing 
equipment and large screens. Drafts can be sent back and forth and be worked on 
simultaneously from different locations.  
 
Part of the motivation behind choosing North-West Russia as location for their 
business establishment is clearly the opportunities in future petroleum developments. 
“When Shtokman comes we are already present. We are however in no hurry. We are 
involved in other projects.” The downside of the expected developments is that costs 
in the area will rise. “When Shtokman and other developments take place, the cost 
level will rise rapidly. There will be a lack of skilled personnel in North-West 
Russia“. Then Reinertsen NWR will lose some of its price advantage for the present 
markets outside of North-West Russia. The upside is that Reinertsen NWR will be in 
an excellent position to participate in the developments.  
 
Reinertsen is in the process of launching a marketing campaign towards potential 
Russian customers. Torkild Reinertsen will do much of the campaigning personally, 
and will in any case be strongly involved in the process.  
 
Potential Russian customers include among others Gazprom with daughter 
companies, Rosneft and Lukoil. “In the Norwegian market we have utilized our 
capacity and must look outwards to expand. We need to diversify in order to have a 
foothold in Russia when the recess comes in the Norwegian market. Our 
establishment in Russia is a result of 20 years of building competence. We have many 
international customers that know our competences and what we stand for,” says 
Torkild Reinertsen.  
 
Torkild Reinertsen says that they have close ties to Gazflot and Gazprom in 
Murmansk. At this moment they are taking their business a step further in acquiring 
land and building new production facilities across the bay from their existing plant. 
Their new neighbors at this location will be Gazflot, a WOS of petroleum giant 
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Gazprom. Gazprom officials are also scheduled to visit Reinertsen’s main office in 
Trondheim.  
 
The new engineering and fabrication facility will officially be opened the governor of 
Murmansk Oblast and Norway’s Prime Minister in early June. 
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7. Analysis 
In this chapter we will link the empirical findings to the theory in order to analyze the 
situation and comment on factors that in our opinion form important elements of 
Reinertsen NWR’s success.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Our research model based on Dunning's eclectic theory 
 
As our research model shows, we have divided the empirical data into internal and 
external factors, as well as factors concerning Reinertsen AS’ motives and incentives 
to internalize intangible resources such as knowledge and tangible competences such 
as workforce and equipment.  
 
Dunning’s theory has been widely used for FDI research, exploring obstacles to and 
success factors for FDI (Tolentino, 2001). Several reports on FDI into Russia find that 
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Russia’s ability to attract FDI has been low compared to comparable emerging 
markets (Jones et al., 2000; Moore, 2006; World Bank, 2006; OECD, 2006; 
Shevtsova, 2006). Russia has been seen as a highly uncertain and unpredictable 
country to do business in. The pessimists have seen their previsions come true, 
especially in the strategically important oil and gas sector, where several more or less 
open mock processes have led to increased government control and losses for foreign 
companies (Economist, 2006; Moscow Times, 2006;2007; NYT, 2006). 
 
Why then, has it been possible for Reinertsen NWR to write black numbers already 
after two years? In other words: "What were the success factors for Reinertsen AS’ 
Foreign Direct Investment into the Russian petroleum sub-supplier market?" 
 
We have drawn a wide and at some points deep picture of the background relevant to 
answering this question. In order to convey an understanding of the important cultural 
aspect we have gone through the Russian history. To convey an understanding of the 
petroleum business we have accounted for both the Norwegian and the Russian side 
of this industry. We have presented important aspects of the Russian economy. We 
have interviewed the driving force and strategist behind the establishment as well as 
the manager facing the daily challenges of doing business in Russia. We have spoken 
to several other experts on and insiders in North-West Russia. The theoretical 
framework has been clarified and methodological issued discussed. We are well 
equipped to do a meaningful analysis.  
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7.1. Reinertsen in Dunning’s eclectic framework:  
7.1.1. Internal factors (Ownership advantages) 
The fact that all business includes some transaction costs leads to the conclusion that 
an internationalizing company must have Ownership advantages. The assumption 
rests on the fact that a company will experience larger transaction costs when going 
abroad in a new market. Competing with local companies with smaller transaction 
costs, the ownership advantage compensates for the costs the internationalizing 
company has relative to local producers. These costs are costs of setting up and 
operating a foreign business. 
Intangible Organizational Factors 
Experience from complex projects and international operations: 
Going abroad, Reinertsen’s experience from complex projects was useful. The 
Uppsala model by Johanson & Vahlne (1977) explains that previous experience may 
help when facing complex projects. The whole establishment process in Murmansk 
may be seen as a complex task in a foreign environment. Despite geographical 
proximity, the psychological distance to North-West Russia is high. Previous 
international experience is according to the Uppsala model advantageous to tackle the 
problems of facing a market with high psychological distance. Reinertsen had 
experience from country such as Sweden, Great Britain, Brazil and Iran.  
High-tech cooperation methods:  
The resource based theory focuses on knowledge as a costly-to-copy asset, driving a 
company’s competitive advantage (Ahokangas, 1998). Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist 
(1994) claim that, in order to prosper, large decentralized organizations must master 
the art of network-learning. In-house, local routines are no longer sufficient, as the 
resource base is spread across borders.  
 
Interaction is a key word in large and complex projects. Several different professional 
disciplines must be accommodated in the same project (Reinertsen, 2007). Time is of 
an essence, and there is little room for delays. In order to make this process as 
efficient as possible, Reinertsen has adopted NASA-inspired working methods. 
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Rooms stuffed with advanced electronics and communication aides have been 
installed at Reinertsen’s different locations. These interaction rooms have several 
large screens, video conferencing and computer equipment, and are used to coordinate 
projects with engineers working together from Murmansk, Gothenburg, Bergen or 
Trondheim. “In this way, we maintain a decentralized resource pool on the 
engineering side. We also expect to save about 30% of working hours and 30% of the 
total engineering time for projects” says Torkild Reinertsen.  
A dedicated and skilled management: 
The management has also been of major importance to Reinertsen NWR’s success. 
Read (2007) emphasizes that sufficient managerial resources is a necessity to succeed 
in international operations.  Svein Grande has been the local manager for Reinertsen 
in Murmansk. His excellent knowledge of Russian culture and language gives him the 
right experience to handle the cultural barriers when working in Murmansk. 
Hofstede’s (2007) overview of the cultural dimensions in Norway and Russia shows a 
great difference in the two cultures. The cultural difference is described as one of the 
main barriers of doing business in Russia. Grande says that mastering the language 
has been an absolute necessity as a leader. The same has his broad working 
experience. His workers expect him, as a leader, to know everything and have an 
answer to everything. The differences in the management culture are huge according 
to Grande. This is underlined by Swahn (2002): She claims that a business leader in 
Russia is supposed to be assertive and omniscient, whereas a Norwegian leader, more 
of a coordinator, is expected to counsel his subordinates so as to utilize their specialist 
knowledge.    
 
The presence and involvement of Reinertsen’s President and top decision maker, 
Torkild Reinertsen, has made the establishment fast and successful. Reinertsen AS’ 
exceptional power of reaction as compared to other large companies has been 
important. In Russia there is a more hierarchical structure where major agreements 
and decisions are made among leaders at the same level of the hierarchy (Strand, 
2005). The more loosely based way of doing business in Russia (Swahn, 2002) makes 
it important to make fast decisions. The involvement of the top management has made 
the company adaptable and flexible and thus been very important in the 
internationalization process. One example is how Reinertsen secured a property next 
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to Gazflot. Decisions had to be made rapidly, and it was an advantage that Torkild 
himself knew the situation. In that way he was available to make the necessary 
decisions in the right time and thereby achieve the advantageously located property.  
The Person of the Decision Maker: 
Torkild Reinertsen seems to be a key factor in many ways. According to Wheelen & 
Hunger (1990), the person of the decision maker is one of the most important internal 
stimuli for a company wanting to take part in an international market. Delaney (1998) 
further lists up 12 qualities a leader should possess to succeed in a market where 
others have difficulties in succeeding (see page 33). Torkild Reinertsen seems to fit 
most of these qualities. When the other suppliers established themselves in Poland, he 
chose a different path, a path entirely new to the business. By taking the risk of 
moving into unchartered territory he has been innovative. He understands the cultural 
differences and tries to learn about the new culture, such as the language. His 
energetic personality has taken him up and down from Trondheim to Murmansk 
several times to solve different problems. It seems as though the establishment 
process in Russia is as important for him as the economic results. He says that he 
wants to gain friends and gladly travel to Russia. He seems very inspired in his work, 
and is an inspiring leader. Svein Grande said that he daily talks with Torkild 
Reinertsen, and that they had a good communication, something that seemed 
important and inspiring for Grande. When we visited Torkild Reinertsen in 
Trondheim, he took us for a tour in the working facilities. Where we entered we could 
clearly see that the workers lit up and became very enthusiastic when they talked to 
Torkild. Being the first Norwegian petroleum supplier taking the big step over the 
boarder to North West Russia, also shows that he is a man of great courage. It seems 
as if he likes to take risks and refuses to shy away in the face of troubles. 
Involvement of the network 
Statoil, a major Norwegian oil-company wanted to take part in the development of the 
fields in the Russian Barents Sea. It saw that assisting Norwegian supply companies 
in entering Russia could be favorable for gaining access as future development 
partners would be met by requirement to buy mostly Russian supplies. The help from 
Statoil has been important for Reinertsen’s establishment and success. Wheelen and 
Hunger (1990) say that following a customer’s internationalization process is an 
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important external stimulus when choosing a market. The incentives offered by Statoil 
to see a supplier establish itself in Russia undoubtedly played a role. Statoil financed 
parts of the employees’ training, and the already existing initial contract with Fluor 
and Statoil guaranteed a steady cash flow in the first critical phases.  
 
Statoil did not only play a role financially, but - argue the authors - also 
psychologically as they actively encouraged Reinertsen NWR’s establishment. Reve 
et al. (1995) argue that a supplier and customer stand in a mutual relationship. The 
supplier forms in many cases integral parts of the customer’s competence. Seeing the 
Statoil actively involve itself in the internationalization process is likely to have 
removed some uncertainties, also at the personal level, for the few main decision 
makers of Reinertsen AS. Also Hydro and Innovation Norway played roles in the 
establishment of Reinertsen NWR (Reinertsen, 2007). The same considerations can be 
applied to their support.  
Timing  
When Reinertsen chose to establish themselves in North West Russia in 2005, the 
timing was excellent. The national and global focus on the High North and on energy 
cooperation between Norway and Russia was strong. High oil prices led to increased 
global interest in the more unavailable arctic resources and the interest in developing 
inter-regional cooperation in the area was great. The regional ministries on both sides 
had heard much talk about the opportunities Norwegian companies wanted to take 
part in, but had seen very little action from the same companies. A willingness to act 
was welcomed.  
 
Hurry (1994) claims that timing is essential for successful internationalization. 
Investments must happen at the right time and be of the right size in order to exploit 
anticipated future developments. Intsok stresses that the time for establishment was 
right as companies such as Sevmorneftegaz and Gazflot were establishing themselves 
in NWR. Becoming a part of the petroleum sub-supplier environment in front of the 
development of the petroleum fields is clever (Skretting, 2007).  
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Tangible Organizational Factors  
Attractive Technology/Products 
Torkild Reinertsen claims that in business, culture takes the back seat to the product. 
He clearly has a point. The Murmansk governor has himself stressed the importance 
of gaining access to Norwegian technology when developing Shtokman 
(Barentsobserver, 2007d). With their willingness to train local sub-suppliers 
(Reinertsen, 2007), Reinertsen NWR becomes an access point to this knowledge. This 
contributes to the perception that Reinertsen gives something back, and in turn to 
increased goodwill. This advantage becomes clearer taking Swahn’s (2002) findings 
on suspicion towards money-makers and the fear of being used into consideration. 
Reinertsen NWR is not your average carpet maker taking advantage of poor Russian 
workers. It is a high-tech producer educating local employees and suppliers.  And- 
mind this – they do not do it for charity, like some Statoil initiatives might resemble 
(Andvik, 2007), but already generate a profit, three years ahead of schedule.  
 
Reinertsen NWR is as yet the only company in North-West Russia that delivers to the 
international oil and gas industry on a significant scale (Skretting, 2007). This 
technological advantage allows for time and resources to build the organization to 
meet future demands instead of being engaged in what often is a sign of a newcomer 
to a market; fierce price-competition.  
Financial strength 
To be able to establish themselves as fast and successfully as Reinertsen, their 
financial solidity has been of great importance. Read (2007) emphasizes that 
sufficient financial resources is of major importance in internationalization processes. 
The financial strength of Reinertsen AS has been crucial to tackle unexpected 
expenses in a business environment that sees contracts as a guideline rather than a set 
agreement and that is utterly unfamiliar with strict western budgeting routines 
(Swahn, 2002).  
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7.1.2. External factors (Location advantages) 
The host country of the FDI must possess some kind of location advantages that favor 
FDI; otherwise the company would focus their resources (Ownership advantage) in 
their home market. The Location advantage is not transferable to other locations and 
is in other words immobile (Dunning, 2001).  
 
Dunning divided Location specific advantages into three main groups (A, B, C):  
(A) Access to and relative cost of production factors that can only be 
exploited by a company in a certain area: 
 
Low wages 
As the petroleum supply industry in Norway faced increased competition, Reinertsen 
and its competitors sought low cost countries to maintain competitiveness. Reinertsen 
NWR produces heavy steel constructions. The nature of these constructions and the 
fact that their construction is different from project to project makes them a labour 
intensive relatively low-tech product. Russia and Murmansk have highly educated and 
experienced workers which are cheaper to employ than their Norwegian equivalents. 
Høiby (2004) says that the average monthly salary for a worker in 2004 was RUR 
6000, which is approximately NOK 1500. The average monthly salary for a 
Norwegian industry worker was at the same time NOK 25.000 (SSB, 2007). To be 
sure, although the Murmansk workforce had experience from similar work, 
substantial initial costs for training occurred and do, for that matter still occur. 
Nevertheless the wage difference plays an important positive role in the equation.  
 
On the negative side, low-cost sub-supplies is not yet an advantage to Reinertsen 
NWR. On the contrary, Svein Grande says that being dependent upon importing much 
of supplies drives up costs to a considerable degree. Reinertsen showing willingness 
to train suppliers makes it likely however, that they will be able to source at least parts 
of their supplies from locals in the future.  
Available and qualified labor 
Another factor is the lack of manpower in Norway. Engineers and welders are much 
easier to recruit in Murmansk than in the soaring Norwegian economy. To 
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internationalize is thus the only feasible option for organic growth. Reinertsen’s high 
technological working environment, using NASA interaction technology, makes it 
possible even for engineers to cooperate on projects between Murmansk, Oslo, 
Trondheim, Bergen and Gothenburg. 
(B) Taxes and trade barriers 
 
The history of Russia shows an unstable political and economical climate. Putin has 
since the year 2000 stabilized the economy and Reinertsen NWR operates in a 
relatively stable business climate today. Even though the major foreign energy 
companies have experienced problems in their Russian field developments there are 
no indications that their smaller suppliers will face the same problems.  
Taxation advantages 
With booming economic growth, FDI into Russia has seen a hike over the last few 
years. As long as a company operates within areas that are not seen as to be of direct 
strategic interest to Russia, they are generally allowed to do business as usual. And 
the profit potential has been great. In order to attract FDI companies are presented 
with different business incentives. The corporate tax level in Russia is generally lower 
than in Norway, ranging from minimum 20% to maximum 24% (Bagautdinov, 2007), 
which is an advantage compared to Norway.  
Being on good terms with the bureaucracy 
Russian bureaucracy is a major trade barrier. An abundance of rules and regulations 
and their far from consequent enforcers literally form a jungle for a newcomer. The 
common advice is to take on a partner (Haugland, 2004; Fadeev, 2007; Andvik, 2007) 
to cut through this jungle. Reinertsen NWR did not, wisely as we will show below, do 
that. Instead they built their own organization, employing among others their own 
accounting staff and logistics staff. They have in-house competence on issues that 
future competitors undeniably will struggle with. The goodwill from the governor was 
also a major advantage, and one shall not downplay the importance of being behind 
guarded fences to keep out eager public servants (Grande, 2007). In other words 
Reinertsen NWR has learnt to deal with the bureaucracy and is safely located behind a 
bureaucracy trade barrier that will face any newcomers to the market.  
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(C) Transportation costs and market access 
 
A closeness in mentality between Norway and North-West Russia.  
Establishing oneself in Murmansk not only provides a geographical proximity to 
Norway, but may also give the advantage of a lower psychological distance than in 
comparable regions such as St. Petersburg and Moscow. Murmansk has long 
experience in trading with Norway in fisheries (Høiby, 2004) and the regions in the 
North have established a broad network of cooperation within cultural and educational 
exchange and to a certain degree business establishments. Cultural elements might be 
learned through interaction with others in the cultures (Jandt, 2004). This has perhaps 
made it easier for Reinertsen NWR to adapt to the local culture and for the locals to 
adapt to Reinertsen NWR. These factors will make it easier for Reinertsen NWR to 
attract Russian customers and suppliers.  
Relations to decision makers 
On the downside it might be unfortunate to be located far from the powerbase 
Moscow and the technological capital St. Petersburg where the management of 
Russian field developments will be (Skretting, 2007). Still, it appears as if Reinertsen 
is on track with their proposal to possible Russian customers and their decision 
makers, especially seeing that they are a preferred neighbor to Gazprom-daughter 
Gazflot’s Murmansk department (Reinertsen, 2007). Swahn (2002) emphasizes the 
importance of close relations when doing business in Russia.  Looking at Haugland 
(2004) and other researchers from the network perspective of internationalization, 
Reinertsen NWR’s opportunity to build relations with Gazflot are excellent: 
Reinertsen NWR is capable of producing tailor-made constructions for complex 
projects that requires close cooperation. Gazflot will be an integral part of such 
projects in North-West Russian developments. Who better to cooperate with than the 
neighbor?  
Looking beyond Shtokman and North-West Russia 
Even though Gazprom had not come to a final decision on Shtokman yet, Reinertsen 
did not wait for a final decision on the gigantic field. Read (2007) points out that 
sufficient strategic vision and motivation are factors which often drive an 
internationalization process. The plan and motivation for Reinertsen in the Russian 
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market was not only Gazprom and Shtokman. The western media have had an 
exaggerated focus on the two (Skretting, 2007). Reinertsen sees that Russia offers 
many other opportunities as well (Reinertsen, 2007). Both Russian and foreign majors 
such as Lukoil, Rosneft, TNK-BP and Conoco Phillips are developing both on and 
offshore fields in the Arctic and elsewhere. Several offshore areas such as 
Prirazlomnoye, Sakhalin and the Caspian Sea are under construction, and several 
other areas might come before or in addition to Shtokman. The experience from the 
Prirazlomnoye field shows that Norwegian companies specialized in offshore 
technology and maritime operations have a considerable market (Barlindhaug, 2006). 
The lack of Russian offshore experience is illustrated by Intsok in figure 18. Where 
the Russian cluster lacked experience, figure 16 shows that the Norwegian cluster is 
well developed.  
 
North-West Russia is an exiting region which presents more than just a low-cost 
labour advantage to Reinertsen NWR. The company is located in one of the most 
promising energy regions in Russia Andersen (1993) stresses the importance of 
investing in a foreign market on a foundation of knowledge and experience from the 
market, and that no other alternative investments which will be more profitable exist. 
Given Reinertsen’s long term thinking, Poland and the Baltic did not seem as 
interesting and profitable in the way Russia and Murmansk did. Torkild Reinertsen 
has a longer perspective than five or then years in his planning. Even tough it is hard 
to predict what will happen in ten or twenty years, they are taking into consideration 
that they will be located in Murmansk for a long time.  
 
It is likely that also future oil and gas will be subject to similar quota criteria as for 
instance the Prirazlomnoye development where 70% of deliveries had to come from 
Russia (Skretting, 2007) and when possible, from local companies. Reinertsen NWR, 
being a Russian company, will thus be in an excellent position to participate in 
upcoming Russian oil and gas projects. Taking the need for investment in the Russian 
oil and gas sector into consideration (Skretting, 2007), the need for Reinertsen’s 
services will be very much present.  
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7.1.3. Internalization factors 
The obvious reason for a MNC to internalize its efforts in another market is to 
maintain control. Two strings of theory are particularly important within the 
internalization literature. Transaction cost theory focuses on the flow of information 
from the market to a company and the flow of information within a MNC, and the 
difference in cost between internal and external sources. The principal-agent theory 
focuses on the relationship between partners in a business relationship.  
 
When Reinertsen AS decided to enter Russia they had, in theory, several different 
entry-mode options to choose from. Root (1994) identifies three different methods of 
entry: 1: The contractual mode. 2: The export mode. 3: The investment mode. Since 
the Russian market was not a target in the first phases of the establishment, the export 
mode was out of the question. Then they were largely left with two alternatives: 
Either some sort of contractual agreement involving transfer of technology and 
competences to a foreign partner in exchange for compensation, or the creation of a 
subsidiary. The motives behind the internationalization process would determine this 
decision. We remember that Reinertsen had been awarded a contract with Statoil, a 
customer with which they have a long history, to construct parts of a compressor 
plant. The production was supposed to take place in a low-cost country. Meeting a 
strict deadline and complying with construction specifications was crucial, and the 
deadline was not far away in time. In reality Reinertsen had no time to find a suitable 
contractual partner that would be approved by Statoil, train the partner and monitor 
him. 
 
FDI was thus the only feasible option left. Now Reinertsen faced a choice between 
establishing a new company and buying one – in cooperation with a partner or not. In 
order to speed up the establishment process, an existing “empty” company (a shelf 
company) was bought. Despite the reluctance to take on a partner they were forced to 
take on a minority interest since access to production facilities was barred. Once the 
Russian minority partner was admitted aboard he pulled some strings and production 
facilities were all of a sudden available. This can be seen as supporting the notion that 
a Russian partner can be advantageous in terms of cutting through the bureaucratic 
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jungle (Andvik, 2007; Fadeev, 2007). As the authors see it, it is yet another token of 
how generally corrupt Russian business is.  
Maintaining control 
Both President Reinertsen and Director Suul say that their motivation for choosing 
FDI as an entry form was to maintain control over risks. The principal-agent theory 
argues that a motivation for internalization of activities is to maintain control since it 
can prove difficult to align a foreign agent’s interests with those of the principal 
company (Norman, 2001). Had Reinertsen decided for instance to license production 
they would face the threat that the partner would use its superior local knowledge to 
act opportunistically on Reinertsen’s expense. Taking Swahn’s (2002) and Hofstede’s 
(2007) findings on cultural differences into consideration, the likelihood of a culture 
crash would have been very large: Swahn (2002) finds Russians to be short-term 
oriented, motivated on a personal and often emotional level, not very contract-bound, 
suspicious towards foreigners and with little business competence. Norwegians on the 
other hand are seen as concerned with literally complying with a contract, being 
motivated by responsibility, naive and maintaining a divide between the professional 
and private spheres. Hofstede’s (2007) five cultural dimensions (see table 1) applied 
to Russia and Norway also present an image of cultures that in many areas are 
different. The risk of alienation is considerable, and it is in the author’s opinion easier 
to act opportunistically towards someone one does not know or understand very well, 
diminishing the chances of a successful principal-agent or partner relationship. This is 
further supported by Barringer & Harrison (2000) and Day (1995) finding that the 
major part of co operations failed before the realization of expectations. Consequently 
we argue that maintaining as much control over the subsidiary as possible, and getting 
rid of the minority interest as soon as possible was a success factor.  
Keeping it in the family 
Reinertsen NWR’s establishment was to a large degree knowledge driven. Reinertsen 
AS is one of Norway’s largest petroleum sub-suppliers and it would not have been in 
a position to establish production in Russia without experience and competence 
gained over year’s activity in the petroleum sector. The transaction cost theory argues 
that transfer of knowledge is easier within a MNC than between market actors 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976). The market for knowledge is described as imperfect due 
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to bargaining problems, pricing difficulties and buyer uncertainty (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976). If we also add Swahn’s (2002) cultural dimension to the picture, 
knowing Russians to be generally skeptical towards foreign business ventures, it 
would indeed have been difficult for Reinertsen AS to license knowledge and 
technology to Russia on preferable terms. Torkild Reinertsen’s comments on lack of 
knowledge are similar to Swahn’s remarks in claiming that Russian businessmen have 
little knowledge on commercial procedures. Bargaining with a Russian partner on the 
pricing of licensed foreign technology would have been difficult. Thus internalizing 
the knowledge transfer completely was another factor contributing to success. 
 A good reputation 
Another aspect is the value of being present and visible in a market. Norman (2001) 
mentions that internalization is a preferred strategy when reputational effects are 
strong. They certainly are in Russia: Hofstede (2007) argues that uncertainty 
avoidance among Russians is high. Swahn (2002) says Russians are suspicious 
towards foreigners. Hønneland (2006) emphasize the importance of being a known 
actor with the right connections. Had Reinertsen not been so determined to have their 
own sign on the wall of their plant, the positive reputational effects of having the 
governor open their plant, would have been strongly diminished. As of today 
Reinertsen enjoys considerable goodwill from the local community. Gazflot also 
expressed a positive attitude towards their future neighbors Reinertsen NWR 
(Reinertsen, 2007; Grande, 2007). We accordingly argue that being present and in 
Torkild Reinertsen’s words “creating a positive attitude” has been a success factor.  
“Bringing along“ suppliers and customers  
One disadvantage of internalizing the internationalization process is that a company 
may be discriminated in a foreign market (Buckley and Casson, 1976). In the case 
Reinertsen NWR that was not relevant, as they were in the early phases virtually 
independent of both Russian suppliers and the Russian market. Very little project-
approved supplies were locally available and their customers so far have all been 
Norwegian (Suul, 2007). It was actually pretty ingenious to enter the market directly, 
taking advantage of some Location advantages, at the same time being in a position 
that allowed delaying the resource- and time consuming processes of attracting 
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customers and developing qualified suppliers. Resources were freed to focus on 
streamlining operations.  
Communication between corporate management, operative management and 
operators.  
Language and cultural barriers are mentioned as another obstacle (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976). Torkild Reinertsen plays down the importance of culture. He says that 
Svein Grande’s most important function is as a language-carrier, not a cultural-carrier. 
We disagree however, believing that Grande’s description of his management 
technique as “Norwegian, adapted to Russia” reveals one of his most important 
functions in the company. Besides knowing both languages he knows both cultures, 
and  is therefore in a unique position to be a cultural-carrier not only of Norwegian 
culture towards the employees at Reinertsen NWR, but also of Russian culture 
towards Reinertsen AS’ management, thereby decreasing the transaction costs or 
communication costs posed by the risk of misunderstanding between strategic and 
operative management and employees.  
 
This argument is underpinned by Rugman and Verbeke’s (2002) emphasis on the 
importance of two-way information flow. They also mention, as do Buckley and 
Casson (1976) that communication costs are still significant despite of the 
communication flow being internalized. They identify a high volume of accounting 
and control information, large overhead costs due to specially adapted communication 
systems and the need to check the accuracy of the information provided by subsidiary 
managers as drivers of communication costs (Buckley and Casson (1976). Despite 
Reinertsen being a large company, President and co-owner Torkild Reinertsen is very 
much involved in the daily operations. He talks to subsidiary manager Svein Grande 
every day and pays regular visits to Murmansk. One can argue that Torkild 
Reinertsen’s time is costlier than most people, but the authors believe that his hands-
on approach in monitoring Reinertsen NWR significantly contributes to reducing 
communication costs. These communication costs can be derived from 
misunderstandings, hostility across the hierarchy and failure to make decisions in 
time. Avoiding these costs represents another success factor for Reinertsen NWR’s 
establishment.  
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7.2. Summary 
The analysis shows some overlap in regards of the theoretical separation. That is as 
expected. Reality is complex and it is difficult to set up waterproof bulkheads to 
separate different aspects of a process in terms of what are internal factors and 
external factors, and factors pertaining to internalization of processes. Nevertheless, 
the analysis sheds light on several different factors, some of them more unexpected 
than others, that have been welded together to form a successful establishment.  
 
We refrain here from analyzing the analysis. Instead we want to point out a few 
things. Some of the discussed factors, such as the successful position that was 
achieved, will play a larger part in the future, as Reinertsen NWR gains more 
suppliers and customers locally and within Russia. Some factors played a larger part 
initially, such as Statoil’s help, avoiding a partner and separating business from the 
local market conditions. Most of the factors have played and will continue to play 
role.  
 
What we want to point out, that is easily transferable to other similar situations, is the 
importance of an involved top management, good communication schemes, to avoid 
opportunistic partners and finally – thinking long-term. What is perhaps not so easily 
transferable is Reinertsen AS’ solid financial foundation and the network and 
experience it leaned on during the internationalization process. 
 
Woody Allen once said: “Eighty percent of success is showing up”.  Reinertsen NWR 
showed up at a right time. With the competition barely out off the starting blocks, the 
company is well under way in the race: The race for future petroleum developments in 
Russia. 
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Further research issues 
 
The energy cooperation between Norway and Russia will most certainly blossom in 
the next years. Companies will hopefully follow Reinertsen by walking the walk and 
not just talking the talk. When Dr. Vitaly Klitchko (popularly known as Dr. Ironfist), 
a Ukrainian politician, scholar and former heavyweight boxing champion was asked 
what he thought about chess, he answered: "Chess is similar to boxing. You need to 
develop a strategy, and you need to think two or three steps ahead about what your 
opponent is doing. You have to be smart. But what's the difference between chess and 
boxing? In chess, nobody is an expert, but everybody plays. In boxing everybody is an 
expert, but nobody fights."  
 
Reinertsen NWR has now started on the next round in the Russian “ring”; gaining 
Russian customers. This process would be an interesting field of study. So would the 
impact of differences in business culture on conducting business between the 
countries. As discovered in this research, the role of the leader played an important 
part. Research on that topic is suggested, as well as how to minimize risk in choice of 
partner.    
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Appendixes 
 
Interview Guide 
 
Let the conversation flow smoothly. Do not ask questions, unless a certain issue has not been 
covered in the course of the conversation.  
 
Internal factors 
Why did Reinertsen as choose to internationalize? 
Did Reinertsen AS have any prior experience from internationalization processes? 
Why did you choose Russia? What were the other alternatives? 
What characterized the preparations for the internationalization process?  
How did you proceed to gain market knowledge? General and specific knowledge.  
What role did your network play initially. How important was the network? 
Who is involved in decision-making processes and who makes the final calls? 
What has been important in the phases following the establishment? 
 
External factors 
What is in you opinion the greatest risk factors for doing business in Russia. 
Have you used any form of external competence, like consultants to map market, country 
conditions? 
What characterizes your relationship to especially Gazprom and other potential Russian 
customers? 
What is the focus for your establishment? (Only Shtokman?) 
 
Internalization factors 
Why did you choose to take on a Russian partner? 
Why did you choose to end this relationship? 
What were your entry options? 
Why did you choose to enter the market so decisively (NOK 50 million)? 
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